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THE IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE ELECTRIC RATE STRUCTURES FOR IRRIGATION 
CLAY-UNION AND UNION RECs 
by 
Donald c. Taylor and Ardelle A. Lundeen 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this research report. the impacts of alternative electric rates and 
rate structures for irrigation for the Clay-Union and Union rural electric 
cooperatives (RECs) are evaluated. Consideration is given to both different 
levels and different forms of electric rate charges. 
The alternative electric rate structures are evaluated in terms of the 
behavior of managers of hypothetical farms designed to represent "typical" 
irrigator clients served by the two RECs. A linear programming model was 
developed to portray as fully as possible the technical. institutional. and 
economic features associated with each representative farm. 
The managers of the representative farms are presupposed to be able to 
make short-term farm enterprise and irrigation adjustments. as well as long-
term changes in their irrigation technologies. in response to pre-season 
declared changes in electric rate structures for irrigation by REC electric 
power suppliers. The farm enterprise and irrigation technology adjustments 
considered are the use or non-use of two already-present electric power. high 
pressure center pivots; the conversion of the already-present center pivots 
to low pressure and/or diesel power; the purchase of new irrigation systems 
for use on dryland; water distribution by center pivot sprinklers or gated 
pipe. surface-irrigation. gravity flows; the irrigation of crops with greater 
or lesser irrigation requirements than corn; full versus partial irrigation 
rates; and the renting of additional irrigated and/or non-irrigated land. 
The reference point in the linear programming analysis of the represent-
ative farms is the 1985 electric rate structure for irrigation in the two 
RECs. For the Clay-Union REC. the rate structure involves (1) an annual 
minimum - charge per irrigation system of $17.80 per average kilowatt (kW) 
used. (2) a monthly demand charge of $9.00 per peak kW used during each 
monthly billing period when an irrigation system is operated. (3) a two-step 
energy charge. involving 4.2 cents per kilowatt hour (kWh) for the first 100 
kWh per average kW per season and 2.6 cents per kWh for all additional kWh. 
and (4) a load management control option. If the load management option is 
elected. the monthly demand charges are waived. If the load management op-
tion is rejected. a 1.1 cent per kWh credit is received by the irrigator. 
The Union REC rate structure is similar. except that the annual minimum 
charge is assessed against nameplate horsepower (HP) rather than against 
average kWs used and at a rate of $15.40 per HP. 
The study's "baseline solutions" involve the modeling of each represent-
ative farm with its actual electric rate structure for 1985 under four dif-
ferent situations: irrigators with debt- versus equity-financed new irriga-
tion equipment (to see the impacts of financial leveraging on irrigator be-
havior) and with 1985 versus 1980 crop prices (to see the impacts of 
different commodity price levels on irrigator behavior). Attention is given 
to expected electric power revenues received by RECs and levels of farm 
income earned by irrigators with normal precipitation. as well as the 
estimated range in year-to-year revenue/income associated with unusually 
heavy and light precipitati9n. 
A series of electric rates and rate structures differing from those in 
1985 is examined through linear programming analysis as follows: (1) 
electric energy (kWh) charges both lesser and greater than those assessed in 
1985. which enables the estimation of derived demand functions for electric 
power to pump irrigation water. (2) greater and lesser "fixed" up-front an-
nual minimum and monthly demand and variable energy (kWh) charges. and (3) 
differently configured energy (kWh) block rates. namely. single-step. three-
step declining. and three-step increasing block rates. Since an examination 
of the incentives for irrigators to select the load management control option 
doesn't lend itself to linear programming analysis. this aspect of the study 
is evaluated via simple budgeting procedures. 
Major findings 
The most important results from the study are summarized as follows. 
1. In all eight baseline solutions for the two representative farms. 
irrigated crop production is profitable. The irrigation systems. ranging in 
number from two to six per farm. are all electrically powered. All newly 
purchased irrigation systems involve either low pressure (Clay-Union REC ser-
vice area) or gated pipe (Union REC service area) irrigation water distribu-
tion. Corn is consistently the most common irrigated crop although. in some 
situations. irrigated soybeans are also profitable. Partial irrigation and 
rented irrigated land are not profitable in any of the solutions. 
2. The impacts of 7% to 38% higher crop prices in 1980 than in 1985 are 
very substantial. These impacts include greatly increased irrigator profits 
($59.000 to $78.000 per irrigator in the baseline solutions). considerably 
higher direct price elasticities of demand for electricity to pump irrigation 
water in the upper price ranges of the kWh energy charges. and more extensive 
irrigation. 
3. The impacts of unusual precipitation on RECs are expectedly the op-
posite of those on irrigators. With the baseline solutions. for example. un-
usually heavy precipitation results in a $330 to $440 reduction (7% to 10%) 
in REC electric power revenue per irrigator but a $3.600 to $26.400 increase 
in irrigator profits. With unusually light precipitation. on the other hand. 
REC electric power revenues per irrigator are $375 to $500 more. and ir-
rigator profits are $9.500 to $54.000 less. This outcome arises primarily 
because of a much greater impact of unusual precipitation on irrigators' 
dryland crop yields and income than on their irrigation electric power 
payments. 
4. In several important respects. rational economic behavior by 
leveraged irrigators with debt-financed irrigation equipment is quite dif-
ferent from that by irrigators with equity-financed irrigation equipment. 
For example. irrigators with equity-financed new irrigation equipment gener-
ally are more responsive in power use to changes in kWh energy charges in the 
higher range of electricity prices than are their debt-financing 
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counterparts. Further. their incomes are much less susceptible to 
fluctuation when unusual precipitation occurs than are the incomes of their 
debt-financing counterparts. 
~ 
5. The direct price elasticities of demand for electricity to pump ir-
rigation water for various segments on the estimated demand functions range 
from being very inelastic (considerably less than -1.00) at "low" electricity 
prices to being very elastic (between -1.62 and -12.00) at "high" electricity 
prices. The 1985 baseline average variable energy charges per kWh of 
electricity rest within the most inelastic segments of the 20 estimated 
demand functions. With an increase from the 1985 rates of as little as 1 to 
3 cents per kWh. however. irrigators in a majority of the situations examined 
would have economic incentive to cut back on the level of electricity that 
they use in pumping irrigation water. Electricity prices would have to rise 
from 7 to 34 cents per kWh. however. before "typical" irrigators would total-
ly stop using electric power to energize their irrigation systems (with 
diesel fuel at $0.97 per gallon). 
6. The cross demand elasticities for irrigation water (in response to 
different electric power rates) are much lower than the direct price elas-
ticities of demand for electricity to pump irrigation water. This outcome 
arises because. as electric power rates increase. diesel powered irrigation 
systems replace part of the electric powered systems. 
7. The "fixed" cost electric power components [plant-related 
"facilities" and wholesale monthly demand electric power (kW) charges] com-
prise between 75% and 80% of the total electricity costs for pumping irriga-
tion water. Because of the need for capital assets to eventually be 
replaced. the relative importance of "fixed" costs does not generally dimin-
ish over time. The variable energy (kWh) charges constitute the remaining 
20% to 25% of the total electricity costs for irrigation pumping. 
8. A possible Clay-Union and Union REC pricing policy to reduce by 75% 
the annual minimum or monthly demand electric rates. while holding the energy 
(kWh) charge the same. shows prospects for: 
Either no change or some increase in the amounts of irrigation 
water pumped and electric power used for pumping irrigation water; 
A 20% to 30% reduction in REC irrigation power revenue: and 
An increase of $1 0 800 to $3 0 550 in the return to labor and manage-
ment for individual irrigator customers. 
9. The impacts of modified energy (kWh) block rates on irrigation 
electric power and water usage are relatively limited. As long as the 1985 
"fixed" up-front electric rate components are retained in the rate structure. 
the impacts of the single-step. three-step declining. and three-step increas-
ing block rates examined (rather than the 1985 two-step declining block rate) 
on energy and water usage are 1% or less. 
10. When the "fixed" up-front 
more sizeable impacts of modified 
energy and water use are experienced. 
electric rate charges are set at zero. 
energy (kWh) block rates on irrigation 
The impacts do not conform to a single 
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pattern, however, as might be hypothesized on the basis of micro production 
theory (all other things the same). For example, common patterns of 
increased energy and/or water usage are not associated with more strongly 
graduated declining block~ rates (than in the 1985 baseline electric rate 
structure). Neither are common patterns of decreased energy and/or water 
usage associated with the three-step increasing energy (kWh) block rate 
charges. 
11. Irrigators who follow the Clay-Union and Union REC load management 
control program, and do not thereby sustain yield losses, clearly derive 
economic benefits from the load management option. If only very modest yield 
losses ( < 2% of normal) would be sustained from following load management, 
however, irrigators should not follow the load management program. 
The Clay-Union and Union REC load management control option provides op-
portunity for irrigators to voluntarily withdraw from the program at any time 
they so desire. Results of analysis show that irrigators would be well-
advised economically to enter and stay under the load management program as 
long as irrigation system power interruptions do not create yield-reducing 
moisture-stress for irrigated crops. For every billing month that irrigators 
do so, they can avail themselves of waived monthly demand charges. If such 
stress conditions do arise, however, irrigators would be well-advised to inr 
mediately opt out of the load management program, continue to pump irrigation 
water, and be no worse off economically during that billing month than their 
all-season load management non-follower counterparts. 
Iaplications of findings to electric rate pricing policies 
These findings have at least three direct implications to electric rate 
pricing policies. 
1. Current electric rates fall within the most inelastic segments of 
the estimated direct price demand functions for electricity to pump irriga-
tion water. Increases in the variable energy charge of as little as 1 to 3 
cents per kWh would likely lead to some reductions from baseline levels in 
electric power use by irrigators. Variable energy charge increases of as 
much as 7 to 34 cents per kWh would have to take place, however, before most 
current electric power irrigators would totally shift away from electric to 
diesel power sources (with diesel fuel at $0.97 per gallon). 
2. The short-run implications of unusual precipitation on REC revenues 
are expectedly the opposite of those on irrigator profits. If the negative 
impacts on irrigators from drought are great enough to force the irrigators 
out of business, however, both the irrigators and their "parent" RECs stand 
to lose. Thus, a rate structure that provides for the sharing of risks be-
tween RECs and irrigators from unusual precipitation can be expected to be in 
the best long-term economic interests of both irrigators and RECs. 
Two features of the current Clay-Union and Union REC electric rate 
structures for irrigation provide for the sharing of risks between irrigators 
and RECs during seasons of unusual precipitation. The spreading of the 
"fixed" up-front costs over fewer kWhs results in higher average costs per 
kWh in years of unusually heavy precipitation (and hence limited irrigation 
pumping). The two-stepped declining energy (kWh) block rate also results in 
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higher average variable energy (kWh) costs with heavy precipitation. 
Conversely. when precipitation during an irrigation season is unusually 
light. both features contribute to a below normal overall average cost per 
kWh for the electric power µsed by an irrigator. 
3. Load management programs to control peak power demands are of 
definite increasing interest in South Dakota. The central features that make 
the Clay-Union and Union REC load management option attractive to irrigators 
are (1) the potential for irrigators to avoid paying monthly demand charges 
in any month during whi ch 20 hour per day irrigation is adequate to meet the 
moisture needs of their crops and (2) the possibility for load management 
followers to opt out of the load management control program (with no greater 
penalty than to pay the monthly demand charge) whenever they determine that 
20 hour per day irrigation would result in yield-reducing moisture-stress. 
This double-barreled feature of the program contributes to the mutual 
economic welfare of both the electric power supplier and the electric power 
user. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This is the third in a series of five Economics Department reports on a 
research project. "The ~ Economic Impact of Alternative Electric Rate 
Structures on Energy and Water Use". sponsored by the South Dakota 
Agricultural Experiment Station. Supplemental funding for the research was 
provided by the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). Golden. Colorado. 
The purpose of this third report is to present the empirical results 
from the study of different electric rates and rate structures for irrigation 
for the Clay-Union and Union rural electric cooperatives (RECs) in southeas-
tern South Dakota. As a prelude to the presentation of results. abbreviated 
descriptions of the overall electric rate structure-irrigation research 
project and the Clay-Union and Union REC representative farm models used in 
the research are provided. 
The initially presented results--termed the "baseline solutions"--are 
based on the modeling of the representative farms with the actual electric 
rate structures for irrigation used in 1985 by the Clay-Union and Union RECs. 
The next group of results shows the impacts of variable energy [kilowatt hour 
= kWh] charges that are both lower and higher than those assessed in 1985 on 
the prospective demands for electric power and water for irrigation. The 
results for three types of alternative rate structure analysis are then 
presented. These involve greater and lesser "fixed" up-front and variable 
energy charges. differently configured energy (kWh) block rates. and load 
management controls. The impacts of unusually heavy and light precipitation 
on REC power sales and revenues and irrigator profits are also covered. 
The other reports in this research report series are as follows: 
- No. 1. Enterprise Budgets and Other Data-Sets; Electric Rate 
Structure-Irrigation Study; Clay-Union. Union. Cherry-Todd. 
and Cam-Wal RECs; 
- No. 2. Mixed Integer Linear Programming Model; Electric Rate 
Structure-Irrigation Study; Clay-Union. Union. Cherry-Todd. 
and Cam-Wal RECs; 
- No. 4. The Impacts of Alternative Electric Rate Structures for 
Irrigation. Cherry-Todd REC; and 
- No. 5. The Impacts of Alternative Electric Rate Structures for 
Irrigation. Cam-Wal REC. 
A rather "casual" reader can expect to find this third report to stand on its 
own. Readers with a more serious interest in the empirical findings in this 
report. however. will find it helpful to consult Reports 1 and 2 for detailed 
information on the data-sets and modeling used in the study. Where linkages 
between this and the other reports are particularly strong. references are 
made parenthetically to pertinent sections from the prior reports. 
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OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
About 80% of South Dakota's irrigation pumps are energized by 
electricity. The high cpst and under-utilization of recently developed 
(coal-based) electric power generation facilities have resulted in increased 
wholesale costs of electric power and. in turn. in higher electric rates for 
irrigators and other electric power consumers. Operating within an already 
financially-stressed agriculture. RECs that supply electricity to irrigators 
are exploring possible revisions to rate structures offering prospect of more 
fully meeting the joint needs of themselves and their irrigator clients. 
The research results reported in this publication show the impacts of 
alternative electric rates and rate structures on (1) the demands for power 
to energize irrigation pumps and for irrigation water and (2) expected levels 
of irrigator farm income and REC electric power revenue. Included in the 
analysis is special attention to different levels of commodity prices. debt-
versus equity-financed irrigation equipment. and both average income/revenue 
levels and the estimated range in year-to-year income/revenue associated with 
unusually heavy and light precipitation. 
What represents a "most appropriate" electric rate structure for irriga-
tion for one REC power supplier may not be "most appropriate" for another. A 
host of rather location-specific factors determines what is "most ap-
propriate". These factors include (1) average amounts of and year-to-year 
variations in precipitation and solar radiation (as these impact amounts of 
irrigation water that must be pumped). (2) the lift and source of pumped 
• water. (3) the nature of soils and topography. (4) the spectrum of potential-
ly profitable farm enterprises. (5) the internal financial structure of an 
REC. (6) the importance of irrigation relative to other sectors in an REC's 
power sales. and (7) the philosophic positions of an REC's manager and 
governing board. Taking into account the first four factors. study sites in 
four different South Dakota RECs were selected for separate study and 
analysis. In selecting the RECs and study sites within their respective ser-
vice areas. efforts were made to cover as wide a range as possible of condi-
tions for each of the four factors. 
The study sites for the four selected RECs and a brief description of 
their attributes. relative to the four selection criteria. are as follows 
(for more details. see pp 3-6 and Figures 1 and 2 in Report 1): 
Clay-Union REC. irrigated area east of Vermillion and south of Route 
50 in Clay County. 
*Precipitation--relatively high and stable from year to year. 
*Pump lift--shallow ground water (about 25 ft of lift is common). 
*Soils--light and low-lying. and 
*Farm enterprises--mainly corn and soybeans. but some hog 
farrowing-finishing. small grains. and alfalfa as well; 
- Union REC. irrigated area primarily east of Elk Point and just west of 
the Big Sioux River. but also extending along the north side of Route 29 
north of Elk Point to Route so. 
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*Precipitation and pump lift--similar to the Clay-Union REC, 
*Soils--heavy. with some areas having sufficiently flat topog-
raphy to permit gated pipe i rrigation. and 
*Farm enterprises--similar to the Clay-Union REC.. except for 
fewer hog enterprises and more limited alfalfa production; 
Cherry-Todd REC, irrigated area south of a line roughly between St. 
Francis and Olsonville in Todd County. 
*Precipitation--limited, 
*Pump lift--deep ground water (about 130 ft of lift is common), 
*Soils--light, sandy. well-drained to excessively drained, and 
*Farm enterprises--somewhat narrow range, with cow-calf en-
terprises. corn. alfalfa. and oats being most common; and 
Cam-Wal REC, irrigated area south of Mobridge and just east of the 
Missouri River in Walworth County, 
*Precipitation--lowest of the study sites. 
*Pump . lift--higb lift from the Missouri River. with about 150 ft 
of lift for the "low-lands" research site and 300 ft of lift for the "bluffs" 
research site, 
*Soils--generally heavy. with an undulating topography. which 
precludes "low pressure" water distribution, and 
*Farm enterprises--cow-calf operations and the widest range of 
crops for any study site, including corn, alfalfa, small grains, and annual 
forages (corn silage. sorghum sudan pasture). 
In this report, the results from the study for the Clay-Union and Union 
REC are presented. In Reports 4 and s. the results for the Cherry-Todd and 
Cam-Wal RECs are presented. Subsequent publications will cover more general-
ized findings based on the results for all four RECs. In those publications. 
the interactions between alternative electric rate structures and the con-
trasting irrigation environments represented in the four REC service areas 
will be stressed. 
REPRESENTATIVE FARM MODEL ANALYSIS 
To accomplish the purpose of the research, a hypothetical farm was iden-
tified to represent "typical" irrigator clients served by each REC. A linear 
programming model was developed to portray as fully as possible the techni-
cal. institutional. and economic features associated with each representative 
farm (for a detailed description of the model, see Report 2). 
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Nature and role of representative f aras in the research 
The representative farm models are intended to reflect conditions on 
typical irrigated farms wit h above-average management in the Clay-Union and 
Union REC service areas in 1985. Irrigator farm managers are presupposed to 
be able to make short-term farm enterprise and irrigation adjustments in 
response to pre-season declared changes in electric rates and rate structures 
for irrigation by REC electric power suppliers. They are also presupposed to 
be able to make changes in irrigation technology (e.g •• downgrading irriga-
tion water distribution pressures. shifting from electric to diesel power 
sources. purchasing new irrigation systems) which have long-term im.plications 
to farm resource use. Thus. while the models involve only a single produc-
tion period. a longer term (7 to 15 years) decision-·making planning horizon 
is envisioned for the managers of the representative farms. 
The representative farms are assumed to already be in operation--with 
specified acreages of land (260 and 440 acres. respectively. of irrigated and 
non-irrigated cropland for both RECs and an additional 100 acres of pasture 
for the Clay-Union REC) and generally adequate machinery and equipment. farm 
buildings. and breeding herds (only for the Clay-Union REC representative 
farm) to make economic use of the land. The available machinery and equip-
ment includes two electric power. high pressure center pivot systems (for 
more details on the assumed availability of resources and the constraints on 
resource use for the representative farms. see pp 19-20 and Tables 25 and 26 
in Report 1 and pp 7-8 in Report 2). 
Electric rate structures ~BSJined 
In 1985. the electric rate structures for irrigation for both the 
Clay-Union and Union RECs contained provisions for annual minimum. monthly 
demand. and two-step declining block rate charges. along with a load manage-
ment control option. The rate structures are based on annual cost of service 
studies. as explained in the appendix to this report. 
The specific provisions of the Clay-Union REC electric rate structure 
are as follows: 
Annual minimum charge: $17.80 per average kilowatt (kW) used; 
Monthly demand charge: $9.00 per peak kW used during each monthly 
billing period when an irrigation svstem is operated: 
- Energy charges: 
* First-step. $0.042 per kilowatt hour (kWh) for the first 100 kWh 
per average kW per season; and 
* Second-step. $0.026 per kWh for all additional kWh; 
Load management control. in which the monthly demand charges are 
dropped in exchange for an agreement by an irrigator for power to his (her) 
irrigation systems to be turned off from 5 to 9 pm daily during one or more 
months of the irrigation season; and 
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No load management control. in which irrigation svstems are ener2ized 
without daily interruptions. monthlv demand charger are Paid. and a $0.011 
oer kWh (Basin) credit is received by the irrigator. 
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The Union REC in 1985 had the same rate structure as the Clav-Union 
REC did. except that the annual minimum charge was assesse~ against nameolate 
horsepower (HP) rather than against average kW's used and at a rate of 
$15.40 per HP. 
The "baseline" electric rate structures used in the study are the just-
described rate structures for 1985 for the two RECs. A series of electric 
rates and rate structures differing from those in 1985 was then examined. as 
follows: 
Estimated demand for electric power to pump irrigation water. with 
electric energy (per kWh) charges both lesser and greater than those assessed 
in 1985; 
Greater and lesser "fixed" up-front (annual minimum and monthly 
demand) 4nd variable energy electric rate charges; and 
Differently configured block rates. namely. single-step, three-step 
declining, and three-step increasing energy (kWh) block rates (in contrast to 
the 1985 two-step declining rate). 
Using the linear programming model. "optimal solutions" for the repre-
sentative farms with the 1985 electric rate structures were first determined. 
The results of this analysis show the most profitable farm enterprises and 
irrigation technologies. the amounts of electric power use and electric power 
revenue for irrigation pumping, and the return to operator labor and manage-
ment for each representative farm situation. Most profitable farm plans were 
then determined for each of the just-described electric rate and rate struc-
ture alternatives. The conclusions of the study for all alternatives except 
those involving load management are based on a comparison of the farm or-
ganization, energy use. electric power revenue, and irrigated farm profit 
features of these various plans. Since an examination of the incentives for 
irrigators to select the load management control option doesn't lend itself 
to linear programming analysis, this aspect of the study was evaluated via 
simple budgeting procedures. 
1The two suppliers of electric power to the East River Electric Power 
Cooperative--which in turn supplies electric power to the Clay-Union and 
Union RECs in South Dakota--are the Western Area Power Authority (WAPA) and 
the Basin Electric Power Cooperative~ During 1985 and 1986, Basin- Electric 
granted a $0.02 per kWh credit on all electric power used for irrigation. 
This credit was passed "down the line" to irrigators. The impact of the 
Basin credit on irrigators served by the East River Electric Power 
Cooperative is $0.011 per kWh. The irrigator credit is less than $0.02 per 
kWh because some of the electric power supplied to East River is from WAPA. 
2The average kW demand in the Clay-Union REC is reported to be about 85% of 
the nameplate- HP rating for the p~er unit. 
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Irrigation alternatives considered 
Several options are open to irrigators in responding to different 
electric rates and rate strµctures. In the study of electric rate structures 
for irrigation in the Clay-Union and Union RECs. seven irrigation alterna-
tives were considered. The alternatives -and the underlying rationale for in-
cluding each in the study are as follows (for added detail covering these al-
ternatives. see pp 14-16 and Tables 15. 16. and 19 of Report 1 and pp 8-11 of 
Report 2). 
The uae or nOD-Wle of two alreacly-present. electric poser. high 
pressure [a pivot pressure of about 75 pounds per square inch (psi)] center 
pivot•. A:n important practical question is whether energy prices are so 
high (relative to commodity price levels) that farmers should no longer use 
irrigation systems already present on their farms. One objective of the 
analysis. then. is to determine how high electric power rates can rise before 
it becomes uneconomic So use electrically powered pumps to lift and dis-
tribute irrigation water. 
The coDYersion of already-present center pivot• to low pressure and/or 
diesel power. In response to rising electric power rates. irrigators may 
find it economic to convert their existing irrigation systems to low pressure 
(in the Clay-Union and Union REC service areas. to about 30 psi) and/or to 
diesel power sources. The economic question is whether prospective energy 
savings from low pressure water distribution and/or diesel power will more 
than offset the annualized costs of converting existing equipment from high 
to low pressure and/or from electric to diesel energy sources. The repre-
sentative farm analysis is structured so as to enable a determination of how 
high electric rates can rise before it becomes economic to downgrade water 
distribution pressures and/or give up electricity in favor of diesel power 
for energizing irrigation pumps. 
The purchase of uev irrigation systeas. A:n important practical ques-
tion is whether electric energy-commodity price and other relationships are 
such that farmers can afford to expand the area they irrigate through the 
purchase and use on existing dryland of new irrigation systems. Provision is 
made in the model for the purchase of several types of irrigation systems. 
including electric and diesel powered center pivot and gated pipe (the latter 
for the Union REC only) units. 
Water distribution by center pivot sprinltlers or gated pipe. surface-
irrigation. gravity flows. In part of the Union REC service area. soils 
and topography permit gated pipe. gravity flow water distribution. With 
gated pipe irrigation systems. the energy pumping costs per acre-inch of 
water are much less than with sprinkler systems. Counterbalanced against 
this are larger amounts of irrigation water and irrigation labor that are 
required with gated pipe than with center pivot irrigation. The representa-
tive farm analysis was structured so as to determine whether investments in 
new center pivot sprinkler systems and/or new gated pipe systems (the latter 
only in the Union REC service area) would be economic. 
3unless the already-present electrically powered center pivot systems are 
converted to diesel power (see the next para), the model requires the payment 
of the annual minimum charges no matter whether the systems are used or not. 
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The irrigation of crops with a greater or lesser irrigation 
requireaent than corn. The most commonly irrigated crop in the Clay-Union 
and Union REC service areas is corn. Soybeans are also grown under irriga-
tion -in both areas. and i p Clay County· alfalfa is as well. The irrigation 
requirement for alfalfa is 7CJI. more than that for corn. The irrigation 
requirement for soybeans. on the other hand. is slightly less (2-4%) than 
that for corn. With higher or lower electricity prices for energizing ir-
rigation pumps and different commodity prices. it is conceivable that the 
relative economics of producing crops with different intensities of irriga-
tion water application could shift. 
Full veraus partial irrigation water application rates. One of the 
potential adjustments to rising energy prices is to irrigate at a level less 
than that which meets the full consumptive water requirement of a crop. In 
the Clay-Union and Union REC representative farm models. two levels of par-
tial irrigation. namely. two-thirds and one-third the full application rate. 
were permitted. Based on a "textbook" soil moisture-yield production func-
tion. yields and production costs were adjusted to correspond with the 
reduced irrigation levels. The analysis of this option involved determining 
whether. as electric power rates increase. the reduced pumping and other 
production costs associated with partial (rather than full) irrigation would 
be great enough to compensate for the consequent crop yield losses. 
The renting of additional irrigated land. The final irrigation alter-
native considered involved determining whether the economics of irrigated 
crop production with some of the electric rate structure scenarios are suf fi-
ciently favorable to justify renting a quart~r-section (130 irrigated acres) 
already serviced with a center pivot system. This alternative is analagous 
to the irrigation system purchase option. except that this option involves 
renting rather than purchasing assets and a combined land and irrigation sys-
tem expansion rather than simply an irrigation system expansion. 
Purchasing new irrigation equipaent with debt- ver8118 equity-capital 
Irrigation systems represent multi-period inputs. In economic analysis. 
the investments required for purchasing them need to be spread out (i.e •• 
amortized) over a number of years. Two types of amortization can be 
undertaken. 
A "financial" 
The most commonly 
purchases in South 
type of amortization pertains to debt-financed purchases. 
reported method for debt-financed irrigation system 
Dakota is via a lease-purchase program involving an 
4Provision was also made in the model for renting up to a quarter-section 
of dryland. The rationale for including the land rental options was to 
determine the economic feasibility of a possible expansion of irrigation 
with reduced energy prices and/or increased commodity prices. 
A potential limitation in this approach concerns the drawing of conclusions 
for the macro REC service area (which serves only a fixed land area) based 
on the analysis of a typical representative farm that is given the option to 
rent neighboring land. The fact that only dryland is rented in the optimal 
solutions for both REC representative farms reduces considerably the actual 
impact of this potential limitation. 
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initial downpayment (15.5% of the purchase price). six annual payments (15.7% 
each). and a terminal "buy-out" payment (10%). The debt repayment for 
converting electric power systems to diesel power is commonly amortized over 
four years. whereas the smaller investments for converting from high to low 
pressure water distribution are commonly amortized over two years. 
An "economic" type of amortization reflects a longer-te.rm. equity-
capital (i.e •• farmer-owned capital or savings). economic-profit perspective 
in which no attention is paid to debt repayment terms. The number of years 
and interest rate used in this type of amortization reflect a long-term op-
portunity cost investment perspective of the decision-maker. In this study. 
the "economic" amortization of investment costs was assumed to extend over 15 
years. 
Primarily because of a shorter amortization period (7 versus 15 years). 
but also because of the somewhat higher interest rate implicit in the lease-
purchase terms. the annualized "financial" costs of investing in new irriga-
tion systems in the Clay-Union and Union REC service areas are considerably 
higher (1.5 times as much) -than the corresponding annualized "economic" costs 
(for more detail. see pp 15-16 and Tables 15 in Report 1).5 These substan-
tial cost differences imply that the most rational behavior of irrigators who 
purchase new irrigation equipment with equity-capital may be quite different 
from that for irrigators who have to meet the schedule of debt-repayments as-
sociated with recently or newly purchased irrigation equipment financed by 
debt-capital. 
Collaodity price assuaptions 
The farm enterprise budgets used in analysis were developed using 1985 
input prices. insurance rates. custom rates. wage rates. and capital costs. 
In most of the alternative electric rate and rate structure scenarios. 1985 
commodity prices were also used. To obtain some idea of the impact of dif-
ferent levels of commodity prices. however. in part of the analysis 1980 
rather than 1985 crop prices were used. The 1980 prices were higher than 
those in 1985 0 ranging in "real" (inflation-adjusted) 1985 terms from being 
7% higher for alfalfa to 38% higher for soybeans (Table 1 0 Report 1). 
The commodity prices used in analysis reflect actual market prices for 
South Dakota as reported by the South Dakota Agricultural Statistical Service 
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. It was decided to use actual-market 
prices rather-than government program deficiency or loan payment prices be-
cause only those irrigators with established acreage and yield bases are 
eligible to participate in government grain commodity programs. Further. not 
all irrigators with established acreage and yield bases necessarily par-
ticipate in government programs. Also. the provisions in government programs 
in one year frequently differ from those in other years. Since there is no 
5The annualized "financial" ownership costs represent the present value of 
the series of payments to meet the terms of the lease-purchase agreement--
expressed on an annual basis. The annualized "economic" ownership costs 
represent the present value of a series of payments amortized over 15 years 
at 11% interest to offset the purchase price of irrigation systems. The 
payment factors for the annualized "economic" and "financial" ownership 
costs are 0.14 and 0.21. respectively. 
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"typical" type of irrigator participation in government programs. our 
analysis did not reflect participation by irrigators in the 1985 government 
grain commodity program. Those irrigators with established acreage and yield 
bases who participated in the government program in 1985. howgver. did 
receive higher grain prices than those used in the study's analysis. 
Gross profit •axi•ization 
Solving the linear program representative farm models involved selecting 
the combination of crop and livestock production enterprises and irrigation 
technologies that would maximize the farm's "gross profits". where "gross 
profits" are defined as the surplus of gross revenues over the variable costs 
of farm production. The variable costs of farm production are those which 
could be avoided if production were to be stopped. These include out-of-
pocket production costs (e.g., for fertilizer. tractor fuel, land rent) and 
the annualized costs of newly purchased irrigation equipment. 
In the results presented in this report. the gross profits determined in 
the optimal computer-determined solutions for the representative farms were 
adjusted down to cover the costs of the assumed already-present resources on 
the farms. The annualized costs associated with the already-present land. 
farm machinery and equipment. and livestock-related resources for the 
Clay-Union and Union REC representative farms are $89 0 000 and $80.000. 
respectively (see p 20 and Table 26 of Report 1 and pp 6 and 7 of Report 2 
for added detail). The resulting "net profit" thereby calculated represents 
the return to the irrigator's labor and management. 
Unusual precipitation 
In years of unusually heavy precipitation. farmers pump less irrigation 
water. Other things the same. this impacts REC irrigation revenues negative-
ly. and irrigator profits positively. In years of unusually light precipita-
tion. the implications are the converse. Examining the impacts on REC 
revenues and irrigator profits of unusually heavy and light precipitation is. 
therefore. one analytic focal point in the study. 
The mean May-September precipitation level over the past 31 years at the 
Vermillion weather· station--which serves as the precipitation reference point 
for the Clay-Union and Union REC service areas--is 14.3 inches. To determine 
pertinent levels of unusually heavy and unusually light precipitation to use 
in analysis. the yearly May-September precipitation amounts were arrayed from 
smallest to largest. The general procedure for all RECs was to identify an 
amount exceeded in no more than one to three years out of the 30-34 years for 
which data were available and to term that an "unusually heavy precipitation" 
6The per-bushel deficiency payments received in 1985 by Clay and Union 
County participants in the government feed grain program were as follows: 
corn $0.48 0 oats $0.29. and wheat $1.08. The acreage set-aside requirements 
in 1985 were 10% for corn and oats and 30% for wheat. 
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level. 7 An analagous procedure was 
light precipitation" level. Resulting 
procedure was the identification of 
May-September unusually he~vy and light 
Cl.ay--Union and Union REC service areas. 
followed to determine the "unusually 
from the application of this general 
20.0 and 8.6 inches to represent 
precipitation. respectively. for the 
It was assumed in analysis that representative farm managers had already 
made their farm organizational plans and planted their crops based on normal-
ly expected precipitation. Selected most profitable solutions for the repre-
sentative farms which were based on normally expected precipitation. thus. 
became the reference point for examining the impacts of unusually heavy and 
light precipitation. The examination was via partial budgeting. with joint 
attention to: 
The reduced (increased) irrigation system (a) pumping and (b) repair 
and maintenance costs resulting from reduced (increased) irrigation water ap-
plication rates; 
The increased (reduced) dryland crop yields; and 
The increased (reduced) costs of drying and storing the increased 
(reduced) dryland crop production output associated with unusually heavy 
(light) precipitation (see pp 13-14 and Tables 11 and 12 in Report 1 for 
added detail). 
BASELINE SOLUTIONS 
The "baseline solutions" involve the modeling of the representative 
farms with the actual electric rate structures for irrigation used by the 
Clay-Union and Union RECs in 1985 under two different types of situations: 
irrigators with -debt- versus equity-financed new irrigation equipment and 
with 1985 versus 1980 farm commodity prices. Features common to all eight 
baseline solutions are first noted. Attention is then given to contrasting 
results. in turn. for the Union versus Clay-Union REC representative farms. 
irrigators with debt- versus equity-financed - new irrigation equipment. and 
1980 versus 1985 commodity prices. 
Comllon features 
In all eight baseline solutions for the two representative farms (Tables 
1 and 2). irrigated crop production is profitable. The irrigation systems. 
ranging in number from two to six per farm. are all electrically powered. 
All newly purchased irrigation systems involve either low pressure center 
pivot (Clay-Union REC service area) or gated pipe (Union REC service area) 
irrigation water distribution. Corn is consistently the most profitable 
crop. although in some situations soybeans are also profitable. 
7The years Of available precipitation data for the different reference 
point weather stations in the study ranged from 30 to 34. The unusually 
heavy and light precipitation levels were determined in relation to natural 
break-points among the one to three years of both heaviest and lightest 
annual precipitation. 
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Table 1. Baseline solutions. Clay-Union and Union REC representative farms. irrigators with debt- versus 
equity-financed new irrigation equiment. 1985 commodity pricesa. 
Resource acquisition. 
New irrigation systems purchased 
Existing center pivots converted 
Dryland rented (acres) 
Irrigated production 
Corn (acres) 
Soybeans (acres) 
Total acres 
Total value of production ($) 
..... Dryland production , (acres) 
°' Corn 
Soybeans 
Alfalfa 
Oats 
Total 
Hog farrowing-finishing (brood sows) 
Electric power used for irrigation 
Total cost ($) 
Total kWh 
Average cost per kWh (cents) 
Irrigation water used (acre-feet) 
Return to operator labor and 
management ($) 
Clay-Union REC 
Debt- Equity-
financing financing 
0 
0 
160 
260 CP-HP 
0 
260 
92.040 
404 
165 
11 
20 
.600 
40 
6.243 
82.053 
7.6 
238 
5.370 
3 CP-LP 
2 CP-LP 
156 
520 CP-LP 
130 CP-LP 
650 
216.155 
0 
142 
44 
20 
206 
40 
8. 122 
109.353 
8.0 
594 
9.680 
Union REC 
Debt-
financing 
1 GP 
0 
160 
{'260 CP-HP 
L160 GP 
_Q_ 
420 
148.680 
290 
150 
0 
0 
440 
0 
6.874 
72.555 
9.5 
365 
-10.885 
Equity-
financing 
3 GP 
2 CP-LP 
160 
)260 CP-LP 
l320 GR 
1..2.Q GP 
740 
244. 795 
0 
120 
0 
_o_ 
120 
0 
5.820 
70.119 
8.3 
743 
-2.240 
aThe names of different irrigation systems are abbreviated as follows: CP = center pivot (electric power). HP= 
high pressure. LP = low pressure. and GP = gated pipe. 
.... 
....... 
Tabie 2. Baseline solutions. Clay-Union and Union REC representative farms. irrigators with debt- versus 
equity-financed new irrigation equipment. 1980 crop pricesa 
Resource acquisition 
New irrigation systems purchased 
Existing center pivots converted 
Dryland rented (acres) 
Irrigated production 
Corn (acres) 
Soybeans (acres) 
Total acres 
Total value of production ($) 
Dryland production (acres) 
Corn 
Soybeans 
Alfalfa 
Oats 
Total 
Hog farrowing-finishing (brood sows) 
Electric power used for irrigation 
Total cost ($) 
Total kWh 
Average cost per kWh (cents) 
Irrigation water used (acre-feet) 
Return to operator labor and 
management ($) 
Clay-Union REC 
Debt- Equity-
financing financing 
3CP-LP 4CP-LP 
0 2 CP-LP 
160 160 
260 CP-HP 130 CP-LP 
l2Q CP-LP 650 CP-LP 
650 780 
246.620 277. 720 
21 0 
165 56 
4 4 
20 20 
210 80 
40 40 
12. 232 11.663 
146.706 129. 708 
8.3 9.0 
589 704 
64.315 77 .400 
Union REC 
Debt-
financing 
3 GP 
2 CP-LP 
160 
l260 CP-LP 
480 GP 
_o 
740 
325.230 
0 
120 
0 
0 
120 
0 
5.827 
70.566 
8.3 
749 
67.570 
Equity-
financing 
3 GP 
2 CP-LP 
160 
[260 CP-LP 
320 GP 
160 Gf 
740 
309.210 
0 
120 
0 
0 
120 
0 
5.820 
70.119 
8.3 
743 
66.368 
aThe names of different irrigation systems are abbreviated as follows: CP = center pivot (electric power). HP= 
high pressure. LP = low pressure. and GP = gated pipe. 
Partial irrigation and rented irrigated land are not profitable in any 
of the solutions. Rented dryland, however, is profitable in all eight solu-
tions, and in seven of the . solutions the maximum permitted area of 160 acres 
is rented. These results indicate that, under the assumed conditions, farm-
ers can not afford to pay a premium for land serviced with center pivot ir-
rigation systems of as much as $35 per acre (the assumed irrigated and 
dryland rental rates were $100 and $65 per acre, respectively). 
Union ver•WI Clay-Union REC. 
The extent of irrigation--judged by both the acre-feet of irrigation 
water applied in all four contrasting model situations and the irrigated 
acreage in three of the four situations--is greater for the Union than the 
Clay-Union REC representative farm, especially with 1985 commodity prices. 
The extent of electric power use for irrigation, however, is less for the 
Union than the Clay-Union REC farms. 
These outcomes arise primarily because the newly purchased irrigation 
systems for the Clay-Union REC farm all involve relatively energy-intensive 
center pivots (albeit low pressure units), whereas the newly purchased ir-
rigation systems for the Union REC farm all involve irrigation water-
intensive gated pipe units. Gated pipe irrigation does require heavier rates 
of irrigation water application. It is enough less energy intensive, 
however, that the efficiency of electric power use for the Union REC farm is 
considerably higher than that for the Clay-Union REC farm. A further ex-
planation for the lesser electric power usage on the Union REC farm is a 
25-30% lower irrigation water application requirement for crops irrigated in 
the Union versus the Clay-Union REC study areas. 
For the Clay-Union REC farm, the maximum 
hog farrowing-finishing enterprise is one 
profitable baseline solutions. Hogs were not 
farm. 
number of 40 brood sows in the 
component of all four most 
considered with the Union REC 
Rew irrigation equipaent purchased with debt- versus equity-capital 
In only one of the four baseline solutions involving debt-financing do 
the relatively high annualized costs of purchasing new irrigation equipment 
effectively fail to constrain the expansion of irrigation. This exceptional 
situation involves the Union REC farm with 1980 crop prices--in which three 
new gated pipe systems are purchased and the two high pressure center pivots 
are converted to low pressure. The relatively attractive crop prices of 1980 
and the relatively favorable economics of gated pipe irrigation more than 
compensate for the relatively high cost of debt-financed new irrigation 
equipment. Because the opportunities for expanding irrigation are essential-
ly exhausted in the Union REC solution involving debt-financed new irrigation 
equipment, the solution involving the lower cost equity-financed new irriga-
tion equipment differs little from it. 
ly, 
only 
new 
With 1985 commodity prices, a substantial expansion in irrigation (name-
the addition of two or three more irrigation systems) is economic for 
irrigators with equity-capital (but not with debt-capital) to finance 
irrigation equipment. Both representative farm irrigators with 
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equity-irrigation equipment use more than twice the amount of irrigation 
water than their counterparts who use debt-capital to finance new irrigation 
equipment. The corresponding differential for the Clay-Union REC farm with 
1980 prices is 20%. Irrigai ors with equity-financed new irrigation equipment 
also grow more soybeans under irrigation than their debt-financing counter-
parts do. 
1980 versus 1985 commodity prices 
The impacts of 7% to 38% higher crop prices in 1980 on the optimal rep-
resentative farm solutions, especially for the Clay-Union REC farm, are very 
substantial. Perhaps most importantly, the returns to operator labor and 
management are no longer negative or only modestly positive. The extent of 
increase in returns ranges from $59,000 to $78,000 for the four contrasting 
baseline solutions. 
The value of total irrigated crop production with the 1980 crop prices 
is 1.3 to 2.7 times as much as with 1985 commodity prices. This increase 
reflects most importantly the direct impacts of the crop price increases, but 
also in three of the four contrasting situations an expanded irrigated area 
(from one to three additional irrigated systems with 1980 crop prices). In 
those three situations, from roughly 1.2 to 2.5 times as much irrigation 
water is pumped as with the 1985 prices. 
In two respects, the responses to the higher 1980 commodity prices dif-
fer on the two representative farms. In each case, the Clay-Union REC farm 
shows responsiveness and the Union REC farm does not. The total kilowatt 
hours of electric power used for irrigation is roughly 1.2 to 1.8 times more 
with 1980 than 1985 crop prices for the Clay-Union representative farm--which 
reflects the purchase and use of three to four additional low pressure center 
pivot systems on that farm. The Clay-Union REC farm also responds to the 
relatively greater increase in soybean - (38%) than in corn (24%) prices in 
1980, through having three to four more center pivots of soybeans in its 
solutions with 1980 than 1985 commodity prices. 
UNUSUALLY HEAVY OR LIGHT VERSUS NORMAL PRECIPITATION 
In the part of the analysis described now, the impacts on the baseline 
models of unexpected precipitation during the irrigation season are examined. 
Farmers are assumed to have (1) based their farm plans on normal precipita-
tion levels, (2) planted their crops in the spring, and (3) followed fer-
tilization, plant protection, and other cultural practices in accordance with 
expected yields based on normal precipitation. As the crop season unfolds, 
however, precipitation is assumed to depart from the normal and to be either 
unusually heavy (reaching a level experienced during only 3 to 10 years out 
of 100 yea9s) or unusually light (again, a 3 to 10 out of a 100 year 
occurrence). This is presumed to result in reduced (increased) irrigation 
requirements for irrigated crops and higher (lower) yields for dryland crops. 
8This reflects the one to three year cut-off points for unusually heavy and 
light precipitation that were identified relative to the 30-34 years of 
available precipitation data for the reference point weather stations in the 
study. 
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For each representative farm with 1985 commodity prices and for both the 
debt-· and equity-financed new irrigation equipment situations, the impacts of 
unusual precipitation on the amount of irrigation water pumped, the amount of 
electricity used for pumping irrigation water, the irrigation power revenues 
received by RECs (which, of course, also represent electric energy costs for 
irrigation to irrigators), and the return to operator labor and management 
were determined (Figures 1 and 2). The middle histogram-bars in the figures 
reflect outcomes with normal precipitation; these are termed 100%-level out-
comes. The left histogram-bars reflect outcomes with unusually heavy 
precipitation, and the right bars outcomes with unusually light precipita-
tion. The percentages shown at the top of the left and right bars indicate 
the unusually heavy and light precipitation outcome values relative to the 
respective normal precipitation outcomes. 
The findings from this analysis are described first for the unusually 
heavy precipitation situation and then for the unusually light precipitation 
situation. Because most of the results differ rather markedly for irrigators 
with debt- versus equity-financed new irrigation equipment, special attention 
is given to this dimension in the findings. In instances where the findings 
for the two REC representative farms differ, the name of the REC farm to 
which a finding pertains is shown parenthetically. 
With unusually heavy precipitation, the decreases in the acre-feet of 
irrigation water pumped and the kWh of electricity for pumping irrigation 
water range from 26% (Clay-Union} to 36% (Union). REC irrigation power 
revenues decrease by $330 to -$440 per irrigator, which translate into the 
following percentage decreases: 5% (Clay-Union) and 6% (Union debt-financing 
irrigators) or 15% (Union equity-financing irrigators). The impacts of un-
usually heavy precipitation on the return to irrigator labor and management 
are much greater. The increased return to irrigators using debt-capital to 
finance the purchase of new irrigation equipment ranges from $16,800 (Union) 
to $26,400 (Clay-Union). For equity-financing irrigators, the increases 
range from $3,600 {Union) to $6,000 (Clay-Union); these differences are less 
because of fewer dryland acres in the equity-financing optimal farm 
solutions. 
With unusually light precipitation, opposite and somewhat greater im-
pacts· on irrigation water and electric power usage, REC revenues, and ir-
rigator profits are realized. The greatest differences are in regard to ir-
rigator profits. The decreases in the return to irrigator labor and manage-
ment for the Clay-Union REC farm solutions from light precipitation are more 
than double the corresponding increases from unusually heavy precipitation. 
Analagous differences for the Union REC farm solutions are substantially 
greater (involving 3.7- and 4.5-fold rather than 2-fold differences). These 
outcomes reflect rather modest dryland yield increases from unusually heavy 
precipitation and more substantial dryland yield decreases from unusually 
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light precipitation. 9 
Irrigators with equity-financed new irrigation equipment pump from 2.0 
(Union) to 2.5 (Clay-Uni9n) times as much irrigation water as those with 
debt-financed equipment. - They also experience a much less unstable return to 
their labor and management when unusual precipitation is experienced. This 
outcome reflects the much larger acreages of dryland crops in the baseline 
solutions for irrigators who finance the purchase of new irrigation equipment 
with debt-capital. 
The power usage and REC revenues for irrigators with debt- versus 
equity-financed irrigation equipment differ between the two REC farms. The 
Clay-Union REC equity-financing irrigator uses one-third more electric power 
for pumping irrigation water than his(her) debt-financing counterpart. The 
analagous difference for the Union REC farm is 3% less. The Clay-Union REC 
receives about 40% greater electric power revenues from equity-financing than 
debt-financing irrigators, whereas the Union REC receives 17% to 30% lower 
revenues from its equity-financing irrigators. 
As noted above, the impacts of unusual precipitation on irrigator 
profits are very substantial. These impacts originate from four sources, as 
indicated in Tables 3 and 4 for the Clay-Union and Union REC representative 
farms, respectively. The main finding from this analysis is that the change 
in electric power payments for irrigation associated with unusual precipita-
tion is relatively small. By far the dominant influence on irrigator profits 
is that which arises10rom the impact of unusual precipitation on changes in dryland crop yields. For example, the changes in dryland crop production 
values for the Clay-Union REC farm are roughly 10 to 160 times as great as 
the changes in the electric power payments for irrigation. For the Union REC 
farm, the corresponding "crop production-electric power" cost-multiple is 6 
to 100 times. 
The ranges in irrigator profits associated with unusually heavy versus 
unusually light precipitation are much greater for irrigators with debt-
financed (Clay-Union $80,550: Union $57,295) than equity-financed (Clay-Union 
$18,195: Union - $12,985) new irrigation equipment. This outcome arises be-
cause of fewer dryland crop acres in the equity-financing optimal solutions, 
and the greater economic volatility generally associated with greater 
leveraging. 
These findings expectedly show the short-term impacts of unusual 
precipitation on RECs to be the opposite of those on irrigators. If the 
negative impacts on irrigators from drought are great enough to force irriga-
9rn terms of a "textbook" soil moisture-yield production function, this 
involves movement from the "normal" soil moisture-yield point along the 
production function (1) with heavy precipitation toward the function's 
maximum versus (2) with light precipitation toward the function's inflection 
point. The slope of the production function toward its maximum is, of 
course, shallower than toward its inflection point. 
lOS. . · . . d . d . d . h h ince crop irrigation requirements were a JUSte in accor ance wit t e 
atnounts of unusually heavy and light precipitation, irrigated crop yields 
were assumed to be constant across the three precipitation levels considered 
in the study. 
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Table 3. Sources of impact of unusual precipitation on irrigator profits. Clay-Union REC representative farm 
1985 baseline solutions. irrigators with debt- versus equity-financed new irrigation equipment. 
Source of change in profits 
Irrigators with debt-financed 
new irrigation equipment 
Dryland crop 
N 
+"-
production value 
Irrigation system 
repair and maintenance 
Electric power 
payment for irrigation 
Grain storage and 
drying 
Total 
Irrigators with equity-financed 
new irrigation equipment 
Dryland crop 
production value 
Irrigation system 
repair and maintenance 
Electric power 
payment for irrigation 
Grain storage and 
drying 
Total 
Change in return to irrigator 
labor and management 
associated with unusually 
heavy precipitation 
Ratio to electric 
Dollars power payment changea 
I _ +29,3731 I 89.o I 
+ 459 1.4 
+ I 330 I 1.0 
- 3.762 n/a 
+26.400 80.0 
+ 4.693 10.6 
+ 1.125 2.6 
+ 441 1.0 
292 n/a 
+ 5.967 13.5 
Change in return to irrigator 
labor and management 
associated with unusually 
ligh1 precipitation 
Ratio to electric 
Dollars power payment changea 
-60.848 161.4 
- 524 1.4 
- 377 1.0 
+ 7 ,597 -IJ.1..§. 
-54.152 143 .6 
-11.142 22.1 
- 1. 286 2.6 
- 504 1.0 
+ 702 ~ 
-12.230 24.3 
8 These are the ratios of the changes in profits for the respective sources of profit change to the change in 
the electric power payment for irrigation. e.g •• 29.373 i 330 = 89.0 (see the encircled data in the table). 
~ 
Table 4. Sources of impact of unusual precipitati on on irrigator profits. Union REC representative farm 1985 
baseline solutions. irrigators with debt- versus equity-financed new irrigation equipment. 
Source of change in profits 
Irrigators with debt-financed 
irr igation equipment 
Dryland crop 
production value 
Irrigation system 
N 
\JI 
repair and maintenance 
Electric power 
payment for irrigation 
Grain storage and 
drying 
Total 
new 
Irrigators with equity-financed new 
irrigation equipment 
Dryland crop 
production value 
Irrigation system 
repair and maintenance 
Electric power 
payment for irrigation 
Grain storage and 
drying 
Total 
Change in return to irrigator 
labor and management 
associated with unusually 
heavy precipitation 
Ratio to electric 
Dollars power payment changea 
I +ls,140 I 
+ 604 
+ I 414 I 
- 2,355 
+16.803 
+ 2,467 
+ 851 
+ 399 
149 
+ 3 .568 
[A3:8-J 
1.5 
1.0 
n/a 
40.6 
6.2 
2.1 
1.0 
n/a 
8.9 
Change in return to irrigator 
labor and management 
associated with unusually 
~ight pre~ipitation 
Ratio to electric 
a Dollars Power payment change 
-45,014 
- 625 
- 432 
+ 5 .581 
-40.490 
- 8.635 
879 
423 
+ 521 
- 9.416 
104.2 
1.4 
1.0 
n/a 
93.7 
20.4 
2.1 
1.0 
_m_ 
22.3 
aThese are the ratios of the changes in profits for the respective profit-sources to the change in the 
electric power payment for irrigation. e.g., 18,140 ~ 414 = 43.8 (see the encircled data in the table). 
tors out of business, however, both the irrigators and their "parent" RECs 
stand to lose. Thus, a rate structure that provides for the sharing of risks 
between RECs and irrigators under circumstances of unusual precipitation can 
be expected to be in the be~t long-term economic interests of both irrigators 
and RECs. 
Two features of the current Clay-Union and Union REC electric rate 
structures for irrigation provide for the sharing of risks between irrigators 
and RECs during seasons of unusual precipitation. The spreading of the 
"fixed" up-front costs over fewer kWhs results in higher average costs per 
kWh in years of unusually heavy precipitation (and hence limited irrigation 
pumping). The two-stepped declining energy (kWh) block rate also results in 
higher average variable energy (kWh) costs with heavy precipitation. 
Conversely, when precipitation during an irrigation season is unusually 
light, both features contribute to a below normal overall average cost per 
kWh for the electric power used by an irrigator. 
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THE ESTIMATED DEMANDS FOR ELECTRIC P~ER AND WATER FOR IRRIGATION 
In this section, the impacts of different prices per kWh of electricity 
on (1) the quantities of ~lectricity used to pump irrigation water and (2) 
the quantities of irrigation water pumped are presented. For each represent-
ative farm situation examined, a series of optimal solutions was determined. 
The basic reference point for pricing electricity in the models is the 1985 
electric rate structure for each REC. To simplify the interpretation of the 
results of analysis, however, a single- rather than double-step kWh energy 
charge is used. 
In each of the 10 situations examined for each REC farm, starting with a 
price of 1 cent per kWh, the price of electricity was raised successively by 
1 cent per kWh increments--with all other prices and technological coeffi-
cients held the same--until the use of electric power to pump irrigation 
water became uneconomic. Changes in production enterprises, irrigation tech-
nologies, quantities of electric power used for pumping irrigation water, and 
quantities of irrigation water pumped-- as the kWh energy charge is raised--
were determined. 
Figures 3 and 4 reflect the price of electricity-quantity of electric 
power· results and Figures 5 and 6 feflect the price of electricity-quantity 
of pumped irrigation water results. 1 In economic terms, the first series of 
functional relationships is termed the estimated "direct price demand func-
tions for electricity" and the second is termed the estimated "cross price 
demand functions for irrigation water". 
These demand functions are stepped, as is characteristic of any derived 
demand function estimated with a linear programming model. The dotted por-
tions in the functions represent non-empirically estimated segments between 
the respective pairs of one cent energy charges for which the empirical es-
timations were made. 
Because the kilowatt hour prices are specified in the model runs in in-
teger values and the irrigation crop production activities are specified in 
the models in 130 acre (for center pivot systems) or 160 acre (for gated pipe 
systems) units, many of the steps and vertical segments in the estimated 
demand functions for the individual irrigated farms are rather long. The 
steps involve changes in the numbers of irrigation systems, the types of ir-
rigation technologies (namely. high or low pressure center pivot or gated 
pipe water distribution), and the crops irrigated in the most profitable rep-
11 The figures are presented later in the report--immediately after the 
points in the text at which the empirical findings portrayed in them are 
first discussed. 
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resentative farm solutions with different kWh energy costs. 12 
The real-world aggregate demand functions for all irrigators served by 
any one REC are much smoother (i.e •• more continuous) than the functions 
reported in Figures 3-6. They are smoother because the economic behavior of 
every irrigator is not identical and because some irrigators .hav e non-130 
acre center pivot fields and non-160 acre gated pipe fields. Nevertheless, 
it is common practice in applied economic analysis to assume that t he general 
shape of demand functions estimated from the analysis of "typical" individual 
farms is a reasonable proxy for the general shape of the aggrega te demand 
functions for the real-world situation being examined. 
A total of 10 derived demand functions was estimated for each REC repre-
sentative farm. Ten functions. rather than one, were estimated so as to 
reflect a variety of different circumstances that either apply in fact or 
could conceivably apply to different irrigators served by the RECs at one or 
more points in time. These different circumstances are now briefly noted. 
along with the pairs of analagous panels in the figures that are compared in 
drawing conclusions concerning the respective sets of circumstances: 
i. Irrigators with debt- ver•us 
equipaent: Panels •a• versus "b•. Panels 
•e• versus "f". and Panels "g" versus "h": 
equity-financed ·new irrigation 
•c• versus •d•. Panels 
ii. 1985 versus 1980 comaodity prices, to reflect the impact of dif-
ferent levels of commodity prices on the demands for electric power and ir-
rigation water [the 1980 prices which are 7% to 38% higher than the 1985 
prices reflect more closely than the 1985 cash market prices (otherwise as-
sumed in the study) the level of prices effectively received by participants 
in the 1985 government grain commodity program]: Panels "a" versus "c". 
Panels "b" versus "d". Panels "e" versus "g". Panels "f" versus 
"h". and Panels "i" versus "j": 
111. With versus without aonthly demand charges. to reflect the 
demands for · electric power and irrigation water represented by irrigators who 
do not follow the load management control program versus those who follow the 
program in all five months of the irrigation season (and therefore do not pay 
the monthly demand charges in any of the five months): Panels "a" versus 
"e". Panels "b" versus "f". Panels "c" versus "g". and Panels "d" 
versus "h": and 
iv. With versus without annual a1ll1llUa and aonthly demand charges. to 
reflect the impact of a possible structural change in the electric rate 
structure in which the "fixed" up-front charges would be eliminated and 
electricity payments would be exclusively via an energy (kWh) charge: Panels 
"a" versus "i" and Panels "c" versus "j". 
12To illustrate, see Panel "a" from Figure 4 which is 
reproduced to the right. The number and nature (GP = 
gated pipe. CP = center pivot, HP = high pressure, and 
LP = low pressure) of irrigation systems (all involving 
irrigated corn production) are shown for the optimal 
solutions associated with each vertical segment (single 
point) in the derived demand function. 
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In this section, an overview of the results for the 20 estimated demand 
functions is first provided. Contrasts in the results between the Clay-Union 
and Union REC representative farms are then presented, followed by the 
contrasts represented in eaf h of the above four circumstances. 
Estimated direct price deaand functions for electricity to puap 
irrigation water 
In describing the demand functions in Figures 3 and 4, attention is 
given to (1) the "endpoints" of the functions,· i.e., the amounts of electric 
power used when (a) electricity is priced at 1 cent per kWh versus (b) the 
price of electricity is high enough that pumping with water electric power 
just becomes uneconomic and (2) the direct price elasticities of demand for 
electricity to pump irrigation water. The direct price elasticities of 
demand reflect percentage changes in the quantity of electricity used as 
ratios to corresponding percentage changes in the price of electricity. 
Because of the discrete nature of the functions, "arc elasticities" were cal-
culated over specified segments of the demand functions. The pertinent price 
ranges and estimated elasticities for each demand function are shown in the 
inset for each panel in the two figures. 
Also noted in the insets are the average "variable" energy charges per 
kWh (termed ''B/L kWh costs") in the respective baseline solutions that are 
analagous to the kWh · costs reflected in the respective estimated demand func-
tions. In the panels ("i" and "j") which involve "without" annual mini-
mum (AM) and monthly demand (MD) charges, the AM and MD charges in the 
baseline solutions are allocated· across kWhs--in addition· to the nominal 
energy (kWh) charges. By noting the "location" of the average "B/L kWh 
costs" on the respective demand functions, one can envision the expected type 
of response by irrigators to possible changes from the 1985 levels for the 
kWh energy charge. 
AD overview of the findings. The maximum amounts of electricity used 
for pumping irrigation water (at the lowest electricity prices) range from 
about 60,000 to 170,000 kWh per irrigator. In eight of the 20 situations ex-
amined, these maximum amounts exceed the amounts of power use in the respec-
tive baseline solutions. 
In the 16 model-runs intended to roughly portray the various conditions 
of different irrigators served in 1985 by the two RECs (Panels "•" through 
"h" in each figure), the price per kWh at which electrically powered ir-
rigation systems are no longer economic ranges from 9 to 36 cents. The 1985 
baseline average variable costs per kWh of electricity (over and above the 
"fixed" up-front charges) are less than·2 cents per kWh. The results, there-
fore, show that--with diesel power priced at $0.97 · per gallon--electricity 
costs would have to rise considerably before "typical" irrigators would to-
tally stop using electric power to energize their irrigation systems. 
The numbers of steps in the estimated demand functions range from two to 
six. The direct price elasticities of demand for electricity to pump irriga-
tion water for various segments of the estimated demand functions range from 
being very inelastic (considerably less than -1.00) at "low" electricity 
prices to being very elastic (between -1.62 and -12.00) at "high" electricity 
prices. These elasticity differences have important implications in the 
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demand func tions. 
Figure 3. Es timated direct pr ice demand functions for electricity to pump irrigation water, Clay-
Union REC represen tative farm. 
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Figure 4. Estimated direct pri ce d~mand functions for elec tricity to pump i r rigation wa t e r , Union 
REG representative farm. 
3 l 
consideration of electric rate policies by RECs. If electric rates are 
increased over price ranges involving inelastic demand. total electric power 
revenues can be expected to increase. Conversely. if electric rates are in-
creased over price ranges involving elastic demand. total electric power 
revenues can be expected to~ decline. 
The 1985 baseline average variable energy charges per kWh of electricity 
rest withf~ the most inelastic segments of each of the 20 - estimated demand 
functions. The results of this analysis show that with an increase from 
the 1985 rates of as little as 1 to 3 cents per kWh. however. irrigators in a 
majority of the situations examined would have economic incentive to cut back 
on the level of electricity that they use in pumping irrigation water. 
Union ver8118 Clay-Union RBCs. For all ten comparisons. the quantity 
of electric power used for pumping irrigation water at the lowest electricity 
prices is greater with the Clay-Union than the Union REC representative farm. 
The quantity differential ranges -from roughly 10 0 000 kWh to nearly 70 0 000 kWh 
per irrigator. Key explanations are the (1) lighter· soils and hence 35% to 
40% greater crop irrigation requirement and (2) the infeasibility of gated 
pipe irrigation in the Clay-Union REC study area. 
The price at which the use of electricity to energize irrigation pumps 
becomes uneconomic. on the other hand. is always lower for the Clay-Union REC 
farm. The "maximum price" differential between the two RECs ranges from 2 to 
19 cents per kWh. This outcome arises because the less energy-intensive 
gated pipe systems in the Union (but not Clay-Union) REC service area are 
less vulnerable to higher electricity prices than -are the pressurized center 
pivot sprinkler systems in the Clay-Union REC service area. 
The direct price elasticities of demand for electricity to pump irriga-
tion water are generally somewhat higher for Union REC irrigators than for 
Clay-Union REC irrigators. A main underlying reason is the existence of the 
added-gated pipe option in the Union REC service area. 
Irrigators who use debt- ver8118 equity-capital to finance nev irriga-
tion equipment. At "low" electricity prices. there is no simple pattern of 
irrigators with debt-financed new irrigation equipment using either more or 
less electricity than their equity-financing counterparts. At "high" 
electricity prices for seven of the eight paired comparisons. however. the 
price at which the use of electricity to energize irrigation pumps becomes no 
longer economic is higher (ranging from 7 cents to 12 cents higher) for the 
debt- than equity-financing irrigators. On the surface. this outcome might 
seem surpr1s1ng. However. the lower annualized costs associated with equity-
financed new irrigation equipment apply to the diesel options as well as to 
the electric options. Since the investment requirements for the diesel op-
tions exceed those for the electric options. shifting the assumption in 
analysis from debt- to equity-financing implies some relative cost advantage 
to the diesel versus electric options. 
13A technical exception is the Union REC farm with equity-financing. 1980 
crop prices. and up-front electric charges. The middle segment of its 
demand function. which covers a price range of 11 to 20 cents per kWh. has a 
slightly lower elasticity than its "end" segment covering a price range of 1 
to 11 cents per kWh. 
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In the higher electricity price ranges, 
demand for electricity to pump irrigation 
financing irrigators. With "low" electricity 
outcome prevails. 
the direct price elasticity of 
water is higher for equity-
prices, a generally opposite 
1980 versus 1985 cOllllOdity prices. With the relatively higher 1980 
crop prices, eight of the ten demand functions shift to the right as economic 
theory (with all other conditions the same) would suggest. In four situa-
tions, the entire demand function shifts to the right. In four others, the 
rightward shift is only in the lower kWh price range. In the other two 
situations, the failure of the "other things the same" assumption of economic 
theory to hold gives rise to "unexpected" findings. In one instance, the 
electrically powered irrigation systems drop out at a lower kWh price with 
the 1980 crop prices than they do with the lower 1985 commodity prices. In 
the other instance, less electric energy is used in pumping irrigation water 
in the lower kWh price range with 1980 than 1985 crop prices. The latter 
outcome arises because of the substitution of the two center pivots of -corn 
with 1985 prices by soybeans with 1980 prices. Soybeans require slightly 
less irrigation water than corn and hence, also, less electric power for 
pumping irrigation water. Finally, in nine of the ten paired comparisons, 
the direct price elasticities of demand for electricity to pump irrigation 
water in the upper price ranges of the kWh energy charges are considerably 
higher with 1980 than 1985 commodity prices. 
Paid verllUS waived aonthly d8118Dd charges. In this analysis, the im-
pact on the derived demand for electric power to pump irrigation water of ir-
riga tors choosing to follow load management controls during all five months 
of the irrigation season is examined. With the Clay-Union REC farm, a clear 
pattern is shown in the findings. For all four paired comparisons and at 
"low" kWh prices, load management fol1owers use no more electric power than 
their non-follower counterparts. The kWh price at which electrically ener-
gized irrigation systems become uneconomic is 3 to 4 cents higher for the 
load management followers. 
The outcome for the Union REC farm, however, is quite different. In 
three of the four paired comparisons, electric power usage at "low" electric 
prices is greater for load management followers than non-followers. Further, 
in three of the four paired comparisons, electrically energized irrigation 
systems become uneconomic at lower kWh prices for load management followers 
than for non-followers. 
The direct price elasticities of demand for electricity to pump irriga-
tion water show a definite pattern of being greater at higher kWh prices for 
load management followers than for non-followers. At "low" electricity 
prices on the other hand, no clear patterns of difference are shown. 
Zero versus 1985 levels of up-front electric rate charges. This 
analysis involves further attention to changes in the form of electric rate 
charges. The structural change involves eliminating both types of up-front 
(annual minimum and monthly demand) charges. As a consequence, the total 
payment for electric power for irrigation is assumed to be assessed through 
the single-step energy charge. 
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In three of the four paired comparisons, the electric power demand 
functions are vertically displaced upward roughly to the extent of the 
per-kWh cost equivalent of the up-front charges [e.g., in Figure 3, Panels 
"i" versus "a", by about 5.8 cents (7.6 cents - 1.8 cents)].- These out-
comes imply only a limited impact on irrigation use from the structural 
change in electric power rates. In the fourth situation (Union REC farm, 
debt-financing, 1980 crop prices), however, the structural change in electric 
power rates does impact the nature of the demand for power (e.g., with zero 
up-front charges, electrically powered irrigation systems become non-economic 
at even lower electric power rates than when the up-front charges are in-
cluded in the electric rate structure assessed against farmers). 
The impacts of eliminating both up-front electric rate charges on the 
direct price elasticities of demand for electricity to pump irrigation water 
are generally the same as indicated above with only the monthly demand charge 
being eliminated. However, the extents of elasticity differential with both 
up-front charges eliminated are generally less than those when only the 
monthly demand charge is eliminated. For one of the four paired comparisons 
involving the elimination of both up-front charges, an opposite outcome 
prevails. 
Based on the findings from these last two sections, two types of overall 
conclusions can be drawn. Eliminating altogether one or both of the up-front 
electric rate charges does not lead to one common type of impact on the na-
ture of demand for electricity to pump irrigation water. In some instances, 
the nature of demand is impacted little. In others, the nature of the 
derived demand for electric power is impacted, but with no uniform pattern. 
Second, eliminating altogether one or both of the up-front electric rate 
charges generally leads irrigators to show a more elastic demand for 
electricity to pump irrigation water at higher kWh prices. 
Estiaated cross price deaand functions for irrigation water 
At the lowest electric power rates, the amounts of irrigation water 
pumped per irrigation season per irrigator range from about 175 acre-feet to 
750 acre-feet (Figures 5 and 6). At electricity prices at which electrically 
powered irrigation systems are no longer economic, irrigation water--ranging 
from about 175 acre-feet to 700 acre-feet per irrigator--continues to be 
pumped. 
This outcome arises because, as electric power rates increase, diesel 
powered irrigation systems tend to replace the electric powered systems. In 
7 of the 20 situations examined, the substitution of diesel for electric 
power is complete, i.e., the estimated cross demand functions for irrigation 
water are perfectly inelastic~showing that whenever an electrically powered 
system drops out it is replaced by a diesel powered system. As electric 
power rates rise in the other 13 situations, the scale of irrigation drops 
off some, with diesel systems replacing only part of the electric systems 
that had been economic at lower electric power rates (and, in some instances, 
with diesel sprinkler systems replacing gated pipe systems for which water is 
lifted by electrically energized pumps). 
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figure 6. Estimated c ross pr ice demand functions for irri ga tion water , Unio n REC r ep r esentative 
fa rm. 
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Three of the 10 cross demand functions for irrigation water for the 
Union REC farm have "atypical" backward bending (upward sloping) segments. 
This outcome arises from increased kWh prices at the low end of the kWh price 
spectrum that result in wa e~intensive gated pipe systems replacing center 
pivot systems. with a result that the amounts of irrigation water pumped in-
crease. Then. at higher kWh prices. center pivot diesel systems replace the 
gated pipe systems and hence the amounts of irrigation water pumped decrease. 
The responsiveness of irrigation water pumping to rising electric power 
rates is generally much greater for the Union REC representative farm than 
for the Clay-Union REC farm. This outcome arises because of the added gated 
pipe surface irrigation option on the Union REC farm. 
For six of eight paired comparisons. the cross demand functions for i~ 
rigation water are shifted farther to the right for equity- than debt-
financing irrigators. In five of the eight situations. the demand functions 
for equity-financing irrigators have more steps than do those for debt-
financing irrigators. Further. for nine of the ten comparable situations. 
the cross demand functions for irrigation water are shifted farther to the 
right for irrigators with 1980 crop prices than with the lower 1985 commodity 
prices. 
RATE STRUCTURE ANALYSIS 
In the prior demand analysis. greater attention is given to changes in 
the level of charge than to the form of charge for electricity. In this sec-
tion. relatively more explicit attention is given to the form of electric 
rate charge. The impacts on irrigators and the RECs of different levels of 
up-front (annual minimum and monthly demand) and energy (kWh) charges. dif-
ferently configured energy (kWh) block rates. and load management controls 
are each examined in turn. 
Different levels of •fixed• up-front and variable energy electric rate 
charges 
Rural electric cooperatives are faced with high fixed costs that derive 
directly from their substantial investments in electric power transmission 
and physical plant facilities and indirectly via the cost structure for the 
wholesale power which they purchase that embodies the high fixed cost of 
coal-based electric generation facilities. The appendix to this report 
shows. for example. that 38% of the Clay-Union REC's operating costs for i~ 
rigation are plant-related "facilities" charges. 46% are demand charges. and 
only 15% are variable energy (kWh) charges. In this study's Clay-Union and 
Union REC representative farm · baseline solutions. the "fixed" up-front 
electric charges account for between 75% and 80% of the irrigators' total 
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electric power payments for irrigation (Table 5). 14 
In 
tion of 
rigation 
revenue 
policies 
tomers in 
years of unusually great precipitation and/or widespread participa-
irrigators in acr~age set-aside government commodity programs, ir-
pumping may drop off greatly . To guard against electric power 
shortfalls in such circumstances, most RECs adopt electric pricing 
that result in the passing on of their "fixed" costs to their cus-
the form of "fixed" up-front electric rate charges. 
Some irrigators object to having to make large "fixed" up-front payments 
for their electrically powered irrigation systems. They would prefer that a 
larger proportion of their irrigation electric power payments be in the form 
of energy (kWh) charges. They place particular value on being able to exer-
cise direct control over the amount of their irrigation electric power bills-
-through determining when and for how long during the irrigation season 
charges should be assessed against their irrigation systems. Further, some 
irrigators believe that many of the REC fixed cost facilities are already 
paid off and, therefore, that15hey should not have to continue to bear large up-front electricity payments. 
The cost of service investment analysis outlined in the appendix shows 
(1) the relatively large proportions of REC operating costs that are "fixed" 
and (2) the extended numbers of years over which capital assets are 
depreciated. Once those depreciation periods are exhausted, the capital as-
sets usually have to be replaced, which sets in motion new series of even 
higher dollar rates of depreciation (because of inflation) for the RECs. 
Although large proportions of REC operating costs are "fixed", the 
"fixed" costs do not generally diminish over time, and irrigators served by 
the Clay-Union and Union RECs are reported to be generally accepting of the 
current structure of charges for irrigation pumping power, the impacts of 
pricing electricity through varying proportions of "fixed" up-front and vari-
able energy (kWh) charges are examined. The rationale for undertaking this 
analysis is partly scientific curiosity and partly to generate information 
that could be used in responding to the concerns of irrigators who would 
strongly prefer to pay for electric power via rate structures with a higher 
proportion of variable to fixed charges. 
14Th 1 . . h f . . . . "f" d" . h e annua minimum c arge or an irrigation system is ixe in t at an 
irrigator must pay it regardless of whether or not he operates the system. 
After the expiration of the initial contract period between an irrigator and 
an REC, however, irrigation systems can be "pulled out" without the 
irrigator having a continuing obligation to meet the annual minimum payment 
on the system. 
The monthly demand charge is "fixed" in a different regard. This charge can 
be avoided totally if an irrigation system is not activated during a monthly 
billing period. But an irrigator must pay it in full if the irrigation 
system is used for even "one moment" during the monthly billing period. 
15The periods specified in contracts between irrigators and RECs are 
generally much shorter than the average length of time over which an REC's 
various capital assets are depreciated. 
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Table 5. "Fixed" up-front versus variable energy charges. Clay-Union and Union REC representative farm baseline 
solutions. irrigators with debt- versus equity-financed new irrigation equipment. 1985 and 1980 crop 
prices. 
ClaI-Union REC Union REC 
Debt-financins EguitI-financins Debt-financins EguitI-financins 
Dollars Percent Dollars Percent Dollars Percent Dollars Percent 
Solutions with 1985 
commodity prices 
Annual minimum charges 2.355 37.7 3.175 36.4 2. 749 40.0 2.263 38.9 
Monthly demand charges 2.381 38.2 3.531 40.5 2.734 39.8 2.250 38. 7 
Sub-total of up-front charges (4. 736) (75.9) (6.706) (76.9) (5.483) (79.8) (4.513) (77.6) 
Energy charges 1.507 24.1 2.016 23 .1 1.391 20.2 1.307 .. 22.4 
Total electric power charges 6.243 100.0 8.722 100.0 6.874 100.0 5.820 100.0 
Solutions with 1980 
crop prices 
CJ Annual minimum charges 4.259 34.8 3.810 32.7 2.263 38.8 2.263 38.9 
'° Monthly demand charges 5.269 43 .1 5.457 46.8 2.250 38.6 2.250 38. 7 
Sub-total of up-front charges (9.528) (77.9) (9. 267) (79.5) (4.513) (77 .4) (4.513) (77.6) 
Energy charges 2.704 22.1 2.396 20.5 1.314 22.6 1.307 22.4 
Total electric power charges 12.232 100.0 11.663 100.0 5.827 100.0 5.820 100.0 
In exploring this issue. the impacts of both increasing and decreasing 
one-at-a-time each of the annual minimum. monthly demand. and energy charges 
are determined. All other prices (including only 1985 commodity prices) and 
the technological coefficients are held the same in analysis. The "in-
creased" electric rates are set at double their respective 1985 baseline 
levels. The "decreased" electric rates are set at 25% of their baseline 
levels (i.e •• at 75% less than their respective 1985 baseline levels). 
Optimal solutions for each of the representative farms are determined with 
each of these alternate electric rate structures. 
The results of this analysis for the Clay-Union and Union REC represent-
ative farms are presented in Figures 7 and 8. The histogram-bars that 
reflect results from the baseline solutions with 1985 electric power rates 
are described as showing 100%-level outcomes. The three histogram-bars to 
the left of the center baseline bars reflect outcomes for the respective one-
at-a-time doubling in price for the three electric rate components. and the 
bars to the right of center reflect outcomes for the 75% reduced electric 
rate charges. 
Acre-inches of irrigation water puaped. The one-at-a-time increased 
and decreased up-front and energy charges have essentially no impact on ir-
rigation pumping in three of the four representative farm situations ex-
amined. The exceptional situation involves the Union REC debt-financing 
situation. In this case. a doubling of either the annual minimum or monthly 
demand charge leads to a 53% reduction in irrigation pumping. whereas a 
decrease to 25% of the baseline rates for either of these two types of charg-
es leads to a 53% increase in irrigation pumping. These results arise from 
the elimination of a gated pipe system with the increased up-front charges 
and the addition of an extra gated pipe system with the decreased up-front 
charges. 
Electricity for puaping irrigation water. Patterns of change in ir-
rigation pumping power are only loosely related to changes in irrigation 
pumping. This outcome arises because (1) the irrigation technology options 
considered in the model involve various intensities of energy and water use 
and (2) the optimal solutions reflect a sensitivity to these and other dif-
ferences in the various options considered. 
For the Clay-Union REC farm. the irrigation power pumping requirement is 
the same for the solutions involving one-at-a-time reduced electric rate 
charges as for the 1985 baseline solutions. The solutions involving one-at-
a-time increased electric rate charges. however. involve 20% (equity-
financing of new irrigation equipment) to 46% (debt-financing) less irriga-
tion pumping power being used. 
For Union REC farm irrigators with equity-financed new irrigation equip-
ment. · increased or reduced up-front and energy charges have essentially no 
impact . on the irrigation power pumping requirement. Union REC farm ir-
rigators with debt-financed irrigation equipment. however. respond different-
ly to one-at-a-time changes in up-front charges. Power usage drops by 56% 
when either the annual minimum or monthly demand charge is increased (two 
high pressure center pivots are converted to low pressure and one gated pipe 
system drops out). and increases by 18% when either of the up-front charges 
is decreased (an extra gated pipe system is added). 
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Figure 7. Impacts of one-at-a-time increased and decreased "fixed" up-front (AM• 
annual minimum and MD e monthly demand) and variable (EC = energy charge) electric 
rate charges, Clay-Union REC representative farm, irrigators with debt- versus 
equity-financed new irrigation equipment, 1985 commodity prices. 
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REC irrigation power revenue. A one-at-a-time doubling in the 
individual electric rate charges leads to just as many instances of a 
decrease. as of an increase. in REC irrigation power revenue. Each instance 
of a one-at-a-time reduc~ion in the individual electric rate charges. 
however. involves a reduction in REC irrigation power revenue. The impacts 
of comparable one-at-a-time changes in electric rate charges in each situa-
tion are much more similar between the annual minimum and monthly demand 
rates than between either up-front charge and the energy charge. 
Reducing energy charges to 25% of the baseline rate results in a 15% to 
18% reduction in REC irrigation power revenue. Reducing either annual mini-
mum or monthly demand charges to 25% of their respective baseline rates 
results in a 20% to 30% reduction in REC irrigation power. 
Return to irrigator labor and aanageaent. The pattern of impacts on 
irrigator profits from one-at-a-time increased and decreased electric power 
rates is rather clear. In 11 of the 12 situations involving increased 
electric power rates. profits are impacted negatively. In all 12 situations 
involving decreased electric power rates. profits are impacted positively. 
The negative profit impacts range from roughly $375 to $2.650. whereas the 
positive profit impacts range from roughly $1.800 to $3.550. 
The final focus of analysis in this section is on a very practical con-
sideration to REC management. What if an REC were to decrease its annual 
minimum or monthly demand charges and then unusually heavy precipitation were 
to be experienced? To what extent would REC revenues become vulnerable from 
such a policy decision on rates and such a natural circumstance? 
To investigate this question. differences in REC revenues (and irrigator 
profits) in circumstances with normal versus unusually heavy precipitation--
under assumed one-at-a-time 75% reductions in annual minimum and monthly 
demand charges--are examined. The normal precipitation circumstances are 
those just described in this section. The budgeting of the impacts of un-
usually heavy precipitation is based on the assumptions and procedures used 
for examining this phenomenon in the above section entitled "unusually heavy 
or light versus normal precipitation." 
The findings from this analysis for the two REC representative farms are 
presented in Table 6. Separate attention is given to irrigators with debt-
versus equity-financed new irrigation equipment. The main finding from this 
analysis is the following. If RECs were to reduce by 75% one or the other of 
their up-front electric rate charges and then their irrigator clients were to 
experience unusually heavy precipitation. the REC revenues from electric 
power would be reduced by $330 to $485 per irrigator. These reductions 
amount to 7% to 10% of the respective REC revenues with normal precipitation. 
In response to the unusually heavy precipitation. irrigators with debt-
financed new irrigation equipment would realize added profits ranging from 
nearly $10.000 to over $26.000. The corresponding impacts on profits for ir-
rigators with equity-financed new irrigation equipment are less. but never-
theless substantial (roughly $3.500 to $7.000 per irrigator). 
Because RECs are not permitted by federal law to carry forward positive 
margins from one year to another. even a 7% to 10% unexpected reduction in 
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Table 6. Selected impacts of unusually heavy precipitation when annual minimum and 
monthly demand charges are reduced one-at-a-time to 25% of their respective 
levels in 1985. irrigators with debt-financed versus equity-financed new 
irrigation equipment. Clay-Union and Union REC representative farms. 
Irrigators with debt-financed new 
irrigation equipment 
Impacts on REC revenues 
Dollar decrease per irrigator 
Dollar decrease as a percent of 
the revenue with normal 
precipitation 
Impacts on irrigator profits 
Dollar increase per irrigator 
Dollar profits per irrigator 
with normal precipitation 
Irrigators with eguiti-financed new 
irrigation eguipment 
Impacts on REC revenues 
Dollar decrease per irrigator 
Dollar decrease as a percent of 
the revenue with normal 
precipitation 
Impacts on irrigator profits 
Dollar increase per irrigator 
Dollar profits per irrigator 
with normal precipitation 
Clay-Union REC 
representative farm 
Annual Monthly 
minimum demand 
charge charge 
330 330 
7.4 7.4 
26.515 26.515 
7 .170 7 .185 
441 441 
7.0 7.3 
6.895 6.895 
12.065 12.335 
Union REC 
representative farm 
Annual Monthly 
minimum demand 
charge charge 
485 485 
8.9 8.9 
9.895 9.895 
-a.sos -8.820 
400 400 
9.7 9.6 
3.570 3.570 
230 220 
REC revenue in a particular year would somehow have to be covered in that 
same year. The prior analysis shows that if the REC revenue shortfall occur-
red as a result of unusually heavy precipitation. irrigators with dryland 
would derive substantial e~onomic benefits from the added precipitation. In 
principle. an after-season rate adjustment mechanism could be created to 
transfer enough of that precipitation benefit to the REC to meet its fixed 
cost obligations--in exchange for a concession by the REC to irrigators for 
part of the burden of the electric payment for irrigation to be shifted from 
"fixed" up-front to variable energy (kWh) charges. From three standpoints. 
however. such a pricing policy would probably be ill-advised. 
1. The more complex a rate pricing policy. the greater the difficulties 
in administering the policy. Administrative encumberances could be expected 
to arise in (a) ensuring that all irrigators would know about and clearly un-
derstand the after-season rate adjustment provision. (b) arriving at a common 
agreement between individual irrigators and the REC on whether (and. if so. 
how much) precipitation during the irrigation season is unusually great. and 
(c) collecting the additional electric payments after the irrigation pumping 
season ends. In addition. special pricing features for one electric rate 
class (electric power consuming sector) not shared by other rate classes can 
be expected to lead to possible customer discontent and misunderstanding. 
2. Such a rate adjustment policy would do nothing to compensate for REC 
revenue shortfalls that could arise from non-precipitation based reductions 
in irrigation pumping. e.g •• from acreage set-aside government commodity 
programs. 
3. Perhaps most significant and as indicated above. two features of the 
current electric rate structure already provide for the sharing of risks be-
tween irrigators and RECs during seasons of unusual irrigation pumping. The 
spreading of the "fixed" up-front costs over fewer kWhs results in higher 
average costs per kWh in years of unusually little pumping. The two-stepped 
declining energy (kWh) block rate also results in higher average variable kWh 
costs with limited· irrigation pumping. Conversely. when irrigation pumping 
during an irrigation season is unusually great. both features contribute to a 
below-normal overall average cost per kWh for the electric power used by an 
irrigator. 
Differently configured energy (kWh) charge block rates 
The 1985 Clay-Union and Union REC electric rate structures for irriga-
tion provide for a two-step variable energy (kWh) charge--in addition to 
"fixed" up-front annual minimum and monthly demand-charges. In the analysis 
of differently configured energy (kWh) block rates. attention is given to a 
single-step energy charge and to three-step declining and three-step increas-
ing energy block rates. The "fixed" up-front electric charges are specified 
in some models at 1985 levels and in others at zero levels. The primary pur-
pose of this analysis is to determine if differently configured energy block 
rates. in combination with different policies regarding the assessment of 
"fixed" up-front electric rate charges. would provide incentive for either 
greater or lesser electric power and water usage in irrigation. 
The heights of the steps (i.e •• the levels of the prices for the various 
steps) and the lengths of the steps (i.e •• the numbers of kWhs covered by 
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each bounded step) in the alternative block rate structures were determined 
as follows. The alternative energy block rate prices were specified relative 
to the average costs per kWh in the respective baseline solutions (call them 
AC). These AC values becfme (1) the single-step block rate prices and 
(2) the middle-step prices in the three-step block rate models (Table 7). 
The first and the third-step prices were arbitrarily set at 90% .more and 90% 
less than the respective AC values. In the increasing three-step block 
rate models, the first and third-step declining block rate charges are 
interchanged. 
The first-step energy (kWh) charge in the 1985 electric rate structure 
applies to the first 100 kWh per average kW per season. Since the average kW 
per season differ for high pressure center pivot, low pressure center pivot; 
and gated pipe water distribution, the amounts of power covered by the first 
bounded step for these irrigation technologies are 6,300 kWh, 3,360 kWh, and 
1,680 kWh, respectively. 
The lengths of the blocks in the three-step block rate analysis for the 
debt- and equity-financing Clay-Union and Union REC representative farms were 
determined in relation to the average kWh power usages per irrigation system 
in the respective baseline solutions (call them BL). By arbitrarily divid-
ing each BL by three, the kWh designated for coverage with each of the 
first- and second-steps in the· three-step block rate models were determined 
to be as follows: 
-Clay-Union REC debt-financing irrigator: 13,675 kWh; 
-Clay-Union REC equity-financing irrigator: 7,290 kWh; 
-Union REC debt-financing irrigator: 8,060 kWh; and 
-Union REC equity-financing irrigator: 4,675 kWh. 
The results of the alternative energy block rate analysis are presented 
in Figures 9 and 10. The first histogram-bar in each panel represents the 
baseline solution result. The other histogram-bars represent the results for 
the alternative block rate models as follows: 
- Second and third bars: single-step models; 
- Fourth and fifth bars: three-step declining block rate models; and 
- Sixth and seventh bars: three-step increasing block rate models. 
The "fixed" up-front electric charges were set at the 1985 levels in the 
models underlying the first, second, fourth, and sixth bars and were 
eliminated in the models underlying the third, fifth, and seventh bars. 
As long as the 1985 "fixed" up-front components are retained in the 
electric rate structures, no modified energy block rate structure has any 
significant (more than 1%) impact on irrigation electric power or water usage 
for either REC representative farm. This is shown by the values for the even 
numbered bars in the top two panel-tiers of Figures 9 and 10 differing from 
those for the baseline-bars by no more than 1%·. 
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Table 7. Differently configured variable energy (kWH) block rate charges assumed in analysis. 
Clay-Union and Union REC representative farms. 
Block rate model 
Baseline two-step 
Debt-financing 
Equity-financing 
Single-step 
1985 up-front charges 
Debt-financing 
Equity-financing 
Zero up-front charges 
Debt-financing 
Equity-financing 
Three-step declining block 
1985 up-front charges 
Debt-financing 
Equity-financing 
Zero up-front charges 
Debt-financing 
Equity-financing 
Three-step increasing block 
1985 up-front charges 
Debt-financing 
Equity-financing 
Zero up-front charges 
Debt-financing 
Equity-financing 
Level of charge (cents per kWh) 
Clay-Union REC representative farm Union REC representative farm 
First- Second- Third- First- Second- Third-
step step step step step step 
3.26 
3.26 
1.84 
1.84 
7.61 
7.98 
3.50 
3.50 
14.46 
15.16 
0.18 
0.18 
0.76 
0.80 
1.58 
1.58 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
1.84 
1.84 
7.61 
7.98 
1.84 
1.84 
7.61 
7.98 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
0.18 
0.18 
0.76 
0.80 
3.50 
3.50 
14.46 
15.16 
3.26 
3.26 
1.92 
1.86 
9.47 
8.30 
3.65 
3.53 
17.99 
15.77 
0.19 
0.19 
0.95 
0.83 
1.58 
1.58 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
1.92 
1.86 
9.47 
8.30 
1.92 
1.86 
9.47 
8.30 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
0.19 
0.19 
0.95 
0.83 
3.65 
3.53 
17.99 
15.77 
aThe baseline block rate charges reflect the basic 4.2 and 2.6 cent per kWh two-step energy 
charges. adjusted down by the 1.1 cent per kWh Basin credit and adjusted up by an assumed 5% 
interest time money cost. 
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Figure 9. Impacts of differently configured energy (kWh) block rate charges, Clay-
Union REC representative farm, irrigators with debt- versus equity-financed new 
i rrigation equipment. 
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Figure 10. Impacts of differently configured energy (kWh) block rate charges, Union 
REC representative farm, irrigators with debt- versus equity-financed new irriga-
tion equipment. 
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When the "fixed" up-front electric charge components are set at zero. 
howev~r. some differences arise in irrigation electric power and water usage 
with the modified variable block rate structures versus the respective 
baseline rate structures--especially for the Union REC representative farm. 
The directions of impact for the leveraged Union REC debt-financing irrigator 
are the opposite of those for the Union REC-equity-financing irrigator. 
For the Union REC debt-financing irrigator. the impacts on electric 
energy use of the single-step and the three-step declining block rates and 
the three-step increasing block rate are all essentially the same. namely. 
18% to 20% less power usage. In the first two situations. irrigation water 
pumping is cut by 53%. With the increasing block rate structure. however. 
irrigation pumping increases by 53%. The reduced power and water usage with 
the single-step and three-step declining block rates arises from the dropping 
out of a gated pipe system that is in the baseline solution. With the three-
step increasing block rate. two rather than one gated pipe system and two low 
rather than high pressure center pivots are under corn production. 
For the Union REC equity-financing irrigator. on the other hand. the 
single-step and three-step declining block rates provide incentive for 37% to 
40% more power usage. The added power usage (but reduced irrigation pumping) 
with the single-step block rate arises from the irrigation of (1) six rather 
than (2) two low pressure center pivots of corn and three gated pipe systems 
as in the baseline solution. The added power usage with the three-step 
declining block rate is associated with two high pressure rather than two low 
pressure center privots of corn. 
The Clay-Union REC representative farm is almost totally unresponsive in 
irrigation energy and water use to the modified energy (kWh) block rate 
structures. The only exceptions are (1) a 46% reduction in power use with a 
three-step increasing block rate and zero "fixed" up-front charges for the 
debt-financing irrigator and (2) a 34% increase in power use with a three-
step declining block rate and zero "fixed" up-front charges for the equity-
. financing irrigator. 
In instances of more than a 1% change in electric power usage. REC ir-
rigation power revenues (irrigator payments for power to energize their ir-
rigation pumps) vary directly with the changes in electric power usage. In 
instances of reduced power usage. the percentage reduction in REC irrigation 
power revenue is equal to or greater than the percent reduction in power use. 
In instances of increased power usage. on the other hand. the percentage in-
crease in irrigation power increase is equal to or less than the percent in-
crease in power use. 
For the Clay-Union REC representative farm. the returns to irrigator 
labor· and management. with one exception. are impacted by no more than 3% 
with the different block rate structures. The one exception is a 25% in-
crease in irrigator profit associated with the three-step increasing block 
rate and zero "fixed" up-front electric rate charges. For the Union REC 
debt-financing irrigator. the pattern of outcomes is similar to that for the 
Clay-Union REC representative farm (negative. rather than positive. returns 
are involved with the Union REC farm. however). For the Union REC equity-
financing irrigator. the impacts on the return to· labor and management are 
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positive for each of the modified electric rate structures except one 
(single-step block rate with no "fixed" up-front electric rate charges). 
The two principal fin9ings from the analysis of differently configured 
energy (kWh) block rates are the following. 
1. The impacts of modified energy block rates on irrigation electric 
power and water usage are relatively limited. As long as the 1985 "fixed" 
up-front electric rate components are retained in the rate structures, for 
example, the impacts of the single-step, three-step declining, and three-step 
increasing block rates (rather than the 1985 two-step declining block rate) 
on energy and water usage are 1% or less. 
2. When the "fixed" up-front electric rate charges are set at zero, 
more sizeable impacts of modified energy block rates on irrigation energy and 
water use are experienced. The impacts do not conform to a single pattern, 
however, as might be hypothesized on the basis of simple micro production 
theory (all other things the same). For example, common patterns of in-
creased energy and/or water usage are not associated with more strongly 
graduated declining block rates (than in the 1985 baseline electric rate 
structure). Neither are common patterns of decreased energy and/or water 
usage associated with the three-step increasing energy (kWh) block rate 
charges. 
Load 11811ageaent controls 
As indicated above, the Clay-Union and Union RECe in 1985 offered a load 
management option to their irrigator clients. Monthly demand charges were 
waived during any month of the irrigation season when irrigators wou1d agree 
for the p~er to their irrigation systems to be turned off daily between 5 
and 9 pm. If irrigators did not elect the load management option, they 
were entitled to receive a 1.1 cent per kWh Basic credit for all electric 
power used. 
All-season following of load aanageaent controls. In our initial mic-
roeconomic analysis of load management, we assume that an irrigator would opt 
either to follow load management throughout the entire irrigation season or 
not at all during the irrigation season. Thus, in this part of the analysis, 
no attention is given to the possibility of an irrigator opting into and out 
16In the following analyses, no account is given to the time and 
inconvenience associated with irrigators having to reactivate their 
irrigation systems following the daily 5 to 9 pm shut-downs of their 
systems. This simplified analytic procedure was adopted, not because of a 
view that such time and inconvenience is of no consequence, but because of 
wide variations among irrigators in (1) the amounts of time required to 
reactivate their systems and (2) the value that they place on such added 
time and inconvenience. 
Incidentally, in 1986, provisions for the load management option were 
changed so that the 5 to 9 pm power interruptions were made only on those 
days during the irrigation season when the RECs were experiencing a peaking 
in their power demand. 
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of load management controls depending on whether an irrigated crop is 
experiencing moisture stress. 
In this analysis. a ~o-part budgeting procedure is followed. In the 
first part, the electric power related benefits and costs of load management 
are determined. In the second part, attention is given to possible yield 
losses from following load management. 
The electric power related benefits from following load management are 
represented by the potentially waived monthly demand charges (Table 8). The 
magnitudes of these benefits for the various crops and irrigation tech-
nologies are calculated taking into account the monthly demand charges for 
the different irrigation technologies (Table 20, Report 1) and the monthly 
durations of the irrigation season for the different crops (Table 10, Report 
1). 
The costs of following load management are represented by the aggregate 
amount of the foregone Basin credit to which load management non-followers 
are entitled. These costs reflect the cross-product of: 
- The irrigation application rates (inches) for the respective crops and 
REC service areas (Table 10, Report 1); 
- The acres per irrigation system, namely, 130 for center pivot and 160 
for gated pipe systems: 
- The kilowatt hour requirement per acre-inch of irrigation water pump-
ed, namely, 28.69. 15.35 1 and 5.59 for high pressure center pivot. low pres-
sure center pivot. and gated pipe water distribution. respectively (p 19. 
Report l); and 
- The per-unit Basin credit of $0.011 per kWh. 
By subtracting the electric power related costs from the electric power 
related benefits. the net electric power benefits from following load manage-
ment throughout the duration of the irrigation season are determined. These 
net benefits per irrigation system range from $181 for gated pipe irrigated 
corn in Union County to $2,200 for high pressure center pivot irrigated al-
falfa in - Clay County. Since the net electric power related benefits are 
positive for all combinations of crops and types of irrigation. irrigators in 
the Clay-Union and Union REC service areas could have derived in 1985 a clear 
economic electric power related net benefit from following the load manage-
ment option. 
If by following the load management option. however. the yield of an ir-
rigated crop would be adversely affected. further analysis would be required. 
Yield reductions can be expected if (1) irrigated crops are experiencing 
moisture-related stress and (2) the supply of irrigation water is interrupted 
because of load management controls. 
The second budgeting component, therefore, involves determining the 
break-even yield losses that irrigators can afford to sustain from following 
load management throughout the duration of the irrigation season (Table 9). 
To do this. the net electric power related benefits per irrigation system are 
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Table 8. The electric power related benefits and costs of 
following load ~anagement throughout the 
duration of the irrigation season by crop and 
type of irrigation, Clay-Union and Union REC 
representative farms. 1985.a 
Clay-Union REC 
Corn 
Benefit 
Cost 
Net benefit 
Soybeans 
Benefit 
Cost 
Net benefit 
Alfalfa 
Benefit 
Cost 
Net benefit 
Union REC 
Corn 
Benefit 
Cost 
Net benefit 
Soybeans 
Benefit 
Cost 
Net benefit 
Type of irrigation 
Center pivot Gated 
High Low pipe 
pressure pressure 
(dollars per irrigation system) 
1, 190 642 
r 451 241 -m 401 
1. 785 963 not 
443 237 appli-
1,342 726 cable 
2,975 1,605 l 775 _ill 2.200 1,190 
1,206 642 322 
328 176 l.il.. 
878 466 181 
1,206 642 322 
316 169 137 
890 473 185 
aThe electric power related benefit from following load 
management is represented by the value of the monthly 
demand charges that are waived as a result of an 
irrigator electing to follow the load management option. 
The electric power related cost from following load 
management is represented by the amount of the foregone 
Basin credit to which load management non-followers are 
entitled. 
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Table 9. Break-even per-acre yield losses that 
farmers can afford to sustain from following 
load management throughout the duration of 
the irriga tion season. by crop and type of 
irrigation. Clay-Union and Union REC 
representative farms. 1985. 
TyEe of irrigation 
Center Eivot Gated 
High Low pipe 
pressure pressure 
Clai-Union REC 
Corn (bu) 2.4 1.3 n/a 
Soybeans (bu) 2.0 1.1 n/a 
Alfalfa (ton) 0.38 0.20 n/a 
Union REC 
Corn (bu) 2.9 1.5 0.5 
Soybeans (bu) 1.3 0.7 0 . 2 
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divided by (a) the acres per irrigation system and (b) the 1985 per-unit crop 
prices (Table 1. Report 1). 
For high pressure center pivot irrigators. the break-even per-acre yield 
losses are no greater than 3 bu for corn. 2 bu for soybeans. and 0.38 ton for 
alfalfa. These break-even losses are about 2.0%. 4.3%. and 6.9%. respective-
ly. of the average expected yields with normal precipitation for corn. 
soybeans. and alfalfa (Tables 2 and 40 Report 1). Thus. high pressure. cen-
ter pivot irrigators who anticipate a yield reduction from daily interrup-
tions in irrigation throughout the irrigation season from 5 to 9 pm equal to 
or greater than these amounts are ill-advised economically to follow the load 
management option. With lesser or no anticipated yield losses. irrigators 
can expect to benefit from following the load management option. 
For low pressure center pivot and gated pipe irrigators. the maximum 
tolerable yield losses from all-season load management are considerably less 
than those for high pressure center pivot irrigators. The reduced margin for 
loss arises primarily because of the lesser electric power requirement per 
acre-inch of irrigation water pumped for these types of systems. 
Selective aonth-by-aonth following of load aanageaent controls. In the 
preceding analysis. following load management was treated as a seasonal "all 
or none" proposition. The Clay-Union and Union REC load management option. 
however. provides for the possibility of load management followers to stop 
following the load management option at any time during any month that an ir-
rigator desires to. 
In this section. the possibility of an irrigator following load manage-
ment selectively month-by-month is contrasted with the possibility of an ir-
rigator not opting to follow load management. The contrast is illustrated 
with high and low pressure center pivot (HP-CP and LP-CP) irrigated soybeans 
in the Clay-Union REC service area. 
The benefits and costs of following load management are analyzed month-
by-month. taking into account pertinent technical and economic data (Table 
10). The monthly demand charges associated with HP-CP and LP-CP irrigated 
production in the Clay-Union REC service area are $595 and $321. respectively 
(Col 2). The monthly gross irrigation water applications for Clay-Union 
soybeans are as shown in Col 3. The amounts of the associated monthly fore-
gone Basin credits are shown in Col 4. The net monthly benefits from follow-
ing load management (Col 5) are converted to break-even yield losses as shown 
in Col's 6 and 7. 
The monthly break-even yield losses vary inversely with the amounts of 
monthly irrigation applications. Further. the monthly break-even yield loss-
es are about 85% more with HP than· LP water distribution. The maximum month-
ly break-even yield loss for soybeans (HP water distribution in September). 
however. is only 53 lb per acre (1.8% of the yield with normal 
precipitation). 
Being able to manage irrigation water so as to avoid a minimum level of 
moisture-stress leading to anything less than a 1.8% yield loss during a par-
ticular month is an unrealistic management objective for any irrigator. The 
conclusion of this analysis. therefore. is clear. An irrigator following 
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Table 10. Technical and economic data for assessing the advisability of an irrigator selectively following 
load management month-by-month. center pivot irrigated soybeans. Clay-Union REC study area. 1985. 
Water 
distribution 
pressure and 
month during 
the irrigation 
season 
(1) 
High pressure (HP) 
July 
August 
September 
Season total 
Monthly electric power related 
benefits and costs per center 
pivot from following Break-even monthly 
load management soybean yield losses 
Benefit: that an irrigator could 
waived Cost: foregone Basin credit afford to sustain from 
monthly Gross irrigation Amount of Net !ollowing load management 
demand application foregone Basin monthly d Pounds ger Percent of ¥ormal 
charges($) a (inches) <:J:'edit_(_~1~ benefg_($) ____ li~!"e yield 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
595 5.5 226 369 33 1.1 
595 5.1 209 386 35 1.2 
595 0.2 8 587 53 1.8 
1. 785 10.8 443 1.342 121 4.2 
V1 
°' Low pressure (LP) 
July 321 5.5 121 200 18 0.6 
August 321 5.1 112 209 19 0.7 
September 321 0.2 4 317 28 1.0 
Season total 963 10.8 237 726 65 2.3 
a bFrom Table 20. Report 1. 
From Table 10. Report 1. 
cThe monthly foregone Basin credits are represented by the cross-product of (1) the respective monthly gross 
irrigation applications; (2) 130 acres per center pivot; (3) 28.69 and 15.35 kWh per acre-inch of irrigation 
dwater pumped for HP and LP water distribution. respectively; and (4) .the Basin credit of $0.011 per kWh. 
The net monthly benefits represent the difference between the Col 2 and Col 4 values for the respective 
months. 
eThe monthly pounds per acre yield losses represent the respective net monthly electric power related benefits 
per center pivot divided by (1) 130 acres per center pivot and (2) the 1985 price of soybeans of $0.0857 per 
fpound ($5.14 per bu). 
The irrigated soybean yield in the Clay-Union REC study area is 48 bu per acre. 
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load management who anticipates that a continued 5 to 9 pm interruption in 
irrigation during any particular month would begin to place his irrigated 
crop under any yield-reducing moisture-stress should straightaway "break the 
seal". and opt out y; ! oad management control for the remainder of that 
monthly billing period. 
Does the fact that the load management option is so sensitive to pos-
sible · yield losses imply that irrigators should stay away from load manage-
ment control programs? Depending on the provisions of a particular load 
management control program; the answer could be yes or no. The stipulations 
of the Clay-Union and Union REC load management control option. however. 
provide clear- economic incentive for irrigators to opt for load control in 
all months except those in which power interruptions would result in yield-
reducing moisture-stress. This can be seen from the following. 
An irrigator who rejects load management controls thereby "earns the 
right" to pump irrigation water 24 hours a day. every day of the month. As a 
consequence. he/she "automatically" has to pay the monthly demand charge for 
every month in the irrigation season. 
An irrigator who opts for load management controls can pump irrigation 
water for 20 out of every 24 hours a day every day of the month. with no con-
sequential liability for paying monthly demand charges. As long as pumping 
20 hours per day is adequate to meet the moisture-needs of an irrigated crop. 
the irrigator is clearly better off than his "load management rejection" 
counterpart because he has had a well watered irrigated crop without having 
had to pay any monthly demand charges. 
If yield-reducing moisture-stress should arise with the limited 20 hour 
per day pumping in a particular month. however. the irrigator can immediately 
opt out of the load management control program and pump 24 hours a day. He 
thereby becomes no worse off. regarding the payment of the monthly demand 
charge. than his "load management rejection" counterpart in that month. In 
all months during the irrigation season when 20 hours per day of pumping is 
adequate. on the other hand. the load management follower gains economically 
as he avails himself of the waived monthly demand charges. 
Thus. the central features that make the Clay-Union and Union REC load 
management option attractive to irrigators are (1) the potential for ir-
rigators to avoid paying monthly demand charges in any month during which 20 
hour per day irrigation is adequate to meet the mositure needs of their crops 
and (2) the possibility for a load management followers to opt out of the 
load management control program (with no greater penalty than to pay the 
monthly demand charge) whenever they determine that 20 hour per day irriga-
tion would result in yield-reducing moisture-stress. This double-barreled 
feature of the program contributes to the mutual economic welfare of both the 
electric power supplier and the electric power user. 
17Although the illustration is developed for irrigated soybeans in the 
Clay-Union REC service area. the conclusion for Clay-Union soybeans applies 
also to each of the irrigated crops in both the Clay-Union REC service 
areas. The next most likely "candidate" for a large break-even percentage 
yield loss is alfalfa in May in which the irrigation water application rate 
is 2.1 inches. The break-even yield loss for it. however. is only 1.6%. 
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LIMITATIONS OF THE S'IUDY 
The analytic model employed in this study. as with any other study. 
fails to accommodate all pertinent features of the real-world environment 
being studied. Those features believed to be the most limiting in this 
regard are the following. 
The actual farmer decision-making process is only crudely incorporated 
into the MILP model. The only farmer managerial objective explicitly con-
sidered in the model is the maximization of revenues over and above the vari-
able costs of farm production. No attention is given to other potentially 
quantifiable objectives (regarding. for example. cash-flow management and 
risk management) and less quantifiable objectives (e.g •• preferences regard-
ing family involvement with the farm. farmer involvement in the home. leisure 
time). Neither is attention given to the investment credit (prevailing in 
1985) and · tax deduction dimensions of irrigation investments nor the possible 
participation of irrigators in government grain commodity programs. 
The model covers only a single production period; yet. many decisions 
are made by farmers within the context of several production periods. Crops 
are considered individually; yet. some farmers plan cropping patterns with 
rotational considerations in mind. Specific assumptions (e.g •• center pivots 
that cover only 130 acres and gated pipe systems that cover only 160 acres of 
land each. land and labor resource availabilities. insurance rates. commodity 
storage and marketing practices) may apply to some farms. but certainly not 
to all farms. The same is true for the assumed crop and livestock production 
coefficients and irrigation technologies. Because of these limitations. the 
findings from the study--while based on the soundest analytic procedures that 
we could find and further develop--should not be interpreted as absolutely 
definitive. 
We also realize that the applicability of the findings from the study to 
individual RECs depends importantly on the cost structures and governing 
philosophies of each REC. We hope that this report and others prepared 
through this research project ·will provide some useful insights to RECs as 
they deal with the inherently multi-faceted and complex task of formulating 
electric rate pricing policies for irrigation. 
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APPENDIX 
THE BASES FO ESTABLISHING ELECTRIC RATE STRUCTURES 
CLAY-UNION REc18 
The purpose of this appendix is 
philosophy and procedures that the 
electric rates and rate structures 
(electric power consuming sectors). 
to provide an overview of the underlying 
Clay-Union REC uses in establishing its 
for irrigation and other "rate classes" 
The Clay-Union REC has five rate classes, namely, single phase (mainly 
residential, accounting for 68.4% of REC revenue), large power (loads in excess 
of 50 kVa of transformer capacity, 22.1% of revenue), irrigation (both single 
and three-phase, 6.8% of revenue), commercial three-phase (up to 50 kVa, 1.5% of 
revenues), and street lights (0.2% of revenue). To the maximum extent possible, 
the REC establishes electric rate structures which result in each rate class 
being fully self-supporting. In other words, deliberate efforts are exercised 
to keep one rate class from subsidizing another. 
In this appendix, attention is given to (1) the cost of service investment 
analysis, undertaken annually by the Clay-Union REC, that represents the 
"analytic backbone" for the establishment of the REC's electric rate structure, 
(2) the process for and results from assigning the REC operating costs to the 
various rate classes, and (3) the linkage between those cost assignments and the 
development of the Clay-Union REC electric rate structure for irrigation for 
1985. 
Cost of service investaent analysis 
A Cost of Service Study plays a key role in decisions on the electric rate 
structure determined for each rate class. In the process of undertaking the 
cost of service study, the costs of the REC's total electric plant are allocated 
across the various rate classes. Both the fixed costs associated with the REC's 
total electric plant investment and the variable operating costs--except the 
wholesale costs of purchased electric power--are allocated in accordance with 
the results of the cost of service investment analysis. 
The cost of service methodology used by the Clay-Union REC is based on the 
"minimum practical mile of line" concept. The "minimum" investment costs per 
mile for (1) poles, towers, fixtures, and overhead conductors and (2) under-
ground conductors and devices are determined. These per-mile costs are multi-
plied by the respective mileages of overhead and underground transmission lines 
owned by the REC. The resulting "minimum practical mile of line" investment 
costs are termed as "customer" distribution plant costs. The differences be-
tween the total actual distribution plant investment costs and the "customer" 
18The sources of this appendix are a paper entitled The Modified Colorado 
Concept, Cost of Service Study, Clay-Union and Union RECs, presented at Rate 
Seminar-Cost of Service, Madison, South Dakota, April 30, 1985 and several 
discussions during 1986 and 1987 between the authors and the Manager of 
Clay-Union REC and two of the REC senior staff. 
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costs are termed "capacity" distribution plant costs. The "capacity" costs 
represent plant investment to meet electric load requirements in excess of 
"minimal" quantities of power and energy.19 
The end-of-year depreciated inventory values for each component of the dis-
tribution plant investment are allocated in acco~gance with the above-described 
respective "customer-capacity" investment ratios. The subsequently determined 
overall customer-capacity investment ratio for the entire distribution plant is 
then used to allocate (1) the end-of-year depreciated inventory value for the 
REC "general plant" (office buildings and equipment) and (2) selected operating 
expenses. namely. distribution facility operation and maintenance costs. 
depreciation on investment (over 35 years for lines. transformers. and buildings 
and 2 to 15 years for trucks. tools. and office equipment). taxes. and interest 
on long-term debt. The other non-purchased electric power operating expenses 
are allocated as follows. Meter reading. billing. and collection (termed "cus-
tomer accounting") costs and "sales" costs are assigned totally to the "cus-
tomer" category of expense. The administration and general office expense is 
allocated in accordance with the overall customer-capacity ratio for all other 
operating expenses. 
Assign11ent of the REC operating costs to the various rate classes 
The REC operating costs--inclusive of wholesale purchased electric power--
can be portrayed in each of three contexts. The first two types of portrayal. 
namely. according to accounting line item and type of electric cost. can be 
prepared on the basis of the results of a cost of service investment analysis 
and information on the wholesale purchased power costs. The third type of 
portrayal reflects the assignment of the REC operating costs to the various rate 
classes. 
In this section. the total operating expenses for the 1985 Cost of Service 
Study for the Clay-Union REC are presented and discussed. They are initially 
shown by accounting line item and type of electric cost. The procedures for as-
signing these costs to the various rate classes and the results of using the 
procedure are then indicated. 
Of the total operating expenses reported in the 1985 Cost of Service Study 
for the Clay-Union REC. about 66% are accounted for by the electric power that 
the REC purchases from the East River Electric Power Cooperative in Madison 
(Appendix Table 1). The total demand charge is 50% greater than the total ener-
gy charge. Of the non-purchased electric power costs. the largest are for ad-
ministration and general office (9.9% of the total operating costs). interest on 
19The investment in line transformers is handled in a somewhat analagous way. 
The investment cost per "minimum size" transformer is multiplied by the actual 
number of transformers owned by the REC to determine the "customer" assigned 
transformer costs. The difference between the total actual REC investment in 
transformers and the "customer" cost is termed the "capacity" component of the 
total transformer investment. 
20The investments in "services". "meters". and "installations on consumer 
premises" are assigned totally to the "customer" component of the distribution 
plant costs. 
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investment (8.0%). distribution facility operations and maintenance (7.1%). and 
depreciation on investment (5.9%). 
The REC total operat]Jlg expenses presented in Appendix Table 1 are shown. 
by type of electric cost. in Appendix Table 2. The demand charge represents 
about 38% of the total. the energy charge 25%. the customer charge 21%. and the 
capacity charge 16%. The procedures used for allocating these charges among the 
various rate classes are now discussed. 
The total REC demand. capacity. and energy charges are allocated to the 
various rate classes on the basis of the following: 
Demand: the contribution of each rate class to the total kilowatt (kW) 
demand (coincidental) placed on the East River Power Cooperative through the 
purchase of electric power by the Clay-Union REC: 
Capacity: the contribution to the seasonal non-coincidental peak demand 
of each rate class; and 
Energy: the actual kilowatt hour (kWh) usage by each rate class. 
The allocation of the total customer charge among rate classes is according 
to five individual components: minimum mile of line (52% of the customer 
costs). administration and general office (29%). billing and collections (12%). 
meters and service entrance (6%). and meter reading (1%). These costs are allo-
cated among rate classes on the basis of the following: 
Mininmum mile of line: in direct proportion to the number of customers 
in each rate class; 
Administration and general office: in direct proportion to the revenues 
earned by each rate class; 
Meter reading: the actual average costs of reading meters for the 
respective rate classes; and 
Other cost components: via two different weighted proportions of cus-
tomer .numbers. 
Using these procedures. the Clay-Union REC operating costs are assigned to 
rate classes as shown in Appendix Table 3. A generally similar pattern is shown 
in the relative (percentage) breakdowns among the four type-of-electric-cost 
categories for the various rate classes. The main exceptions to the general 
pattern are (1) a much above-average relative importance of demand (kW) charges 
for the irrigation and large power rate classes. which arises because of extreme 
unevenness in the demand for power from month to month within the year for each 
of these rate classes. and (2) a much below-average relative importance of cus-
tomer charges for the large power rate class. which arises directly from the 
"definition" of that rate class. 
Further insights on inter-comparisons among rate classes can be derived 
from the average allocated costs for the various rate classes shown in Appendix 
Table 4. In the first part of this table are the average cost data. as reported 
directly in the 1985 Cost of Service Study for the Clay-Union REC. The demand 
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Appendix Table 1. Clay-Union REC operating expenses, by 
accounting line item.a 
Expense category 
Purchased electric power 
Demand charge 
Energy charge 
Capacity charge 
Sub-total 
Other operating expenses 
Administration and general office 
Interest on investment 
Distribution facility operations 
and maintenance 
Depreciation on investment 
Customer accounting and sales 
Taxes 
Sub-total 
GRAND TOTAL 
Dollars 
1,406,961 
939, 777 
111,367 
(2,458,105) 
365 ,640 
297 ,640 
264,050 
219,600 
100, 830 
5,060 
(1,252,820) 
3,710,925 
Source: 1985 Cost of Service Study, p 12. 
Percent 
37.9 
25.3 
3.0 
(66.2) 
9.9 
8.0 
7.1 
5.9 
2.7 
0.2 
(33. 8) 
100.0 
ain addition to these operating expenses, the REC is required 
to provide for "margins" (ranging from 0.5 to 1.5 times as 
much as their interest costs). These margins become capital 
credits that are assigned back~over 15 to 20 years--to 
cooperative members in proportion to their patronage of the 
cooperative. 
Appendix Table 2. Clay-Union REC operating 
expenses, by type of electric cost. 
Expense category Dollars Percent 
Demand charge 1,406,961 37.9 
Energy charge 939,777 25.3 
Customer charge 760,046 20.5 
Capacity charge 600, 796 16.2 
Street lights 3 1 345 0.1 
Total 3. 710, 925 100.0 
Source: 1985 Cost of Service Study, p. 12. 
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Appendix Table 3. The Clay-Union REC assignment of operating costs to rate classes.a 
Commercial b Single phase Large power Irrigation three phase Total 
DQllu:s Percent Dollars Percent Dollars Percent Dollars Percent Dollars Percent 
Electric energy costs 
Demand (kW) charge 7 80. 863 30.7 476.960 58.2 116.778 46.4 30.953 34.1 1.406.961 37.9 
Energy (kWh) charge 680.398 26 .8 192.654 23.5 38.531 15.3 26.314 29.0 939.777 25.4 
Sub-total (1. 461. 261) ( 57.5) (669.614) ( 81. 7) (155.309) ( 61. 7) (57 .267) ( 63 .1) (2.346. 738) ( 63.3) 
Plant-related costs 
Customer charges 688.398 27 .1 16.610 2.0 38.579 15.4 16.145 17.7 760.046 20.5 
Capacity charges 391.118 15.4 133.377 16.3 57.676 22.9 17.423 19.2 600. 796 16.2 
Sub-total (1.079.516) ( 42 . 5) (149.987) ( 18.3) (96.255) ( 38.3) (33.568) ( 36. 9) (1.360.842) ( 36.7) 
GRAND TOTAL 2.540. 777 100.0 819.601 100.0 251.564 100.0 90.835 100.0 3.710.925 100.0 
Source: 1985 Cost of Service Study. p. 7. 
aThe actually-used assigned operating costs for establishing the electric rate structures for the various rate classes differ 
slightly (about 1%) from the "Grand Totals" shown below. Adjustments are first made for gross revenue taxes. current margins. 
deferred margins. and other limited purposes. 
bThe total column includes. in addition to the costs for the four rate clases shown in the table. $3.345 of street light-relate 
costs. 
(kW) and energy (kWh) charges are very similar among rate classes. The 
plant-related costs per customer are expectedly below-average for the numerous 
(2.647) single phase customers and above-average for the customers constituting 
the other rate classes (only 35 to 87 customers per rate class). 
The point of greatest difference among rate classes. however. concerns the 
capacity charge. This charge per kWh of power use for irrigation is 2.3 times 
as great as the average for all rate classes for the RECs (2.89 versus 1.26 
cents per kWh). This cost phenomenon arises because of a disproportionately 
large contribution of irrigation to the REC's seasonal non-coincidental peak 
demand for electric power. 
In the second part of Appendix Table 4. the data for the various rate 
classes are standardized across the type-of-electric-cost categories on the 
basis of average per kWh costs. In other words. no matter what the nature of 
the type of electric cost. the total expense for it is divided by the kWh use 
projected in the 1985 Cost of Service Study for the respective rate classes. 
The most striking contrast shown is a 60% above-average cost for the 
electric power used for irrigation (12.6 versus 7.8 cents per kWh). The overall 
electric cost per kWh for irrigation is high because the demand charge per kWh 
for irrigation is twice the average (5.85 versus 2.96 cents per kWh) and the 
plant-related costs are 70% above-average (4.82 versus 2.86 cents per kWh). 
These above-average costs for irrigation reflect (1) above-average electric dis-
tribution plant costs associated with the relative remoteness of location for 
irrigators and (2) the relatively limited volume of kWh usage compared to the 
peak kW demand requirement associated with irrigation pumping that is "energy-
intensive". on the one hand. and limited to only a small part of the year. on 
the other hand. The latter feature precludes the spreading of fixed annual cus-
tomer and capacity charges across large numbers of kWhs. 
Establishaent of the electric rate structure for irrigation 
The electric rate structure for irrigation for the Clay-Union REC has evol-
ved from year to year during the 1980s based on (1) reviews of experience with 
prior rate structures by the management and governing board of the REC and (2) 
preferences expressed by irrigators concerning possible changes in electric rate 
structures. These changes involve both the nature of the electric rate struc-
ture and the within-season timing of payments for the customer and capacity (or 
"facilities") charge. 
For example. several years ago the entire facilities charge for Clay-Union 
REC irrigators was due at the beginning of the irrigation season. A change was 
then made that permitted the facilities charge to be paid at the end of the 
season. with provision for the potential offsetting of part of an irrigator's 
facilities charge by his energy (kWh) charge. 
More recently. in response to a quite commonly held preference by ir-
rigators. two changes were made. To simplify understanding by irrigators of the 
rationale for the electric rate structure for irrigation. a decision was made to 
(1) load the entire REC facilities charge into the "annual minimum" charge and 
(2) essentially pass through to irrigators the wholesale demand (kW) and energy 
(kWh) charges paid to the East River Cooperative. along with necessary margins. 
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Appendix Table 4. Clay-Union REC. average allocated costs. by rate class. 
Commercial All rates 
Single-Ehase Large Eower Irrigation three Ehase classes 
Average cost 
Electric energy 
Demand ($ per kW) 10.52 10.55 10.53 10.46 10.65 
Energy (cents per kWh) 1.95 1.95 1.93 1.99 1.97 
Plant-related 
Customer ($ per year) 257 .08 470. 80 43 8.56 380.10 270.09 
Capacity (cents per kWh) 1.12 1.35 2.89 1.32 1.26 
Standardized average per-kWh cost (cents) 
Electric energy 
Demand 2.24 4.84 5.85 2.34 2.96 
Energy 1.95 1.95 1.93 1.99 1.97 
Sub-total ( 4.19) ( 6. 79) ( 7. 78) ( 4.33) ( 4.93) 
0\ Plant-related \J1 
Customer 1.97 0.17 1.93 1.22 1.60 
Capacity 1.12 1.35 2.89 1.32 1.26 
Sub-total ( 3 .09) ( 1.52) ( 4.82) ( 2.54) ( 2.86) 
GRAND TOTAL 7.28 8.31 12.60 6.87 7 .79 
Source: Adapted from 1985 Cost of Services Study. pp. 3-7 and 11. 
The second change was to allow the annual minimum payment to be paid in three 
. equal installments on July 15th. August 15th. and September 15th. 
Within this guiding . perspective. we now examine the linkage between the 
above assignment of REC operating costs to the irrigation rate class and the 
electric rate structure for irrigation that was established in 1985. 
1. The annual aini.aaa payment represents the dollar charge per average 
kW for each irrigation service. It covers the full REC facilities (plant-
related customer and capacity) charge for ir!fgation. which in the 1985 Cost of 
Service Study is $38 0 155 + $57 0 033 = $95.188. The total horsepower represent-
ed by the electric motors energizing the pumps of the REC's irrigators in 1985 
is 6 0 000. which is equivalent to 5.348 kW. Through dividing $95.188 by 5.348. 
the annual minimum of $17.80 per average kW is determined. 
2. The aonthly deaand payment charge assessed against irrigators is 
directly linked with the wholesale month;! demand payment from the Clay-Union 
REC to the East River Power Cooperative. The total wholesale monthly demand 
payment for irrigation in the 1985 Cost of Service Study is $115 0 460. The total 
kW demand over the irrigation season for the 87 irrigators is 10.960. The 
quotient associated with these two figures is $10.53 per kW. · 
The actual monthly demand payment in the 1985 rate structure for irrigation 
is $9.00 per kW per month. A demand charge somewhat less than $10.53 per kW per 
month was chosen for an interim period. to reduce the magnitude of one-time ad-
justment from the prior year's charge of $7.80 per kW per month. 
3. The energy (kWh) payment for irrigation is also directly linked with • 
the wholesale energy (kWh) charge from the Clay-Union REC to East River. 23 The 
total energy allocation for irrigation in the 1985 Cost of Service Study of 
$38 0 100 was divided by the projected kWh usage of 1.975.000 to obtain an average 
cost of 1.93 cents per kWh for irrigation energy. 
The energy (kWh) charge in the 1985 electric rate structure for irrigation 
is two-stepped. with the costs for the first 100 kWh per kW per season at 4.2 
cents per kWh and all additional kWh at 2.6 cents per kWh. These rates are 
higher than 1.93 cents per kWh to offset the $1.50 per kW shortfall in the 
monthly demand charge and provide a "cushion" to meet the "margin" requirement 
of the REC. The energy (kWh) charge is two-stepped. rather than single-stepped. 
to facilitate the meeting of the monthly demand shortfall. on the one hand. and 
encourage greater electric power usage. on the other. 
21 These figures and those that follCIW are taken from Appendix Table 3. 
slight modifications to conform with the first footnote to the table. 
monthly demand (kWh) and energy (kWh) costs emerging from the Cost of 
Study are also shown in Appendix Table 5. 
with 
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22
rn principle. the monthly demand charge represents the payment for the 
electric power generation and transmission facilities required to meet an REC's 
electric power supply needs at any given time. 
23 rn principle. the energy charge--based on kWh of consumption--represents the 
payment for the resources used in generating electricity. 
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